Chapter 61 Credible Indian Nuclear Deterrent Doctrine” Kalki Gaur

(0)(1022) Chapter 9: Credible Indian Nuclear Doctrine in Multipolar World Order

(1) Hindu deterrent in War

UNITED STATES WILL CAUSE NUCLEAR WAR: It is likely that it will be the United States that first feel moved to threaten and execute a central nuclear strike. This means that the question, Are we deterred, may well be asked first in Washington, rather than in Moscow. This would be reversal of the situation in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, when the Soviet Union had to decide whether or not to attempt to run the U.S. naval blockade. This is the main conclusion of Colin S. Gray in Nuclear Strategy and National Style (p.269). The purpose of Indian Nuclear doctrine is to deter the imperial maritime expansionist policies of the United States in the Unipolar world, where United States is the sole super power.

NEED FOR A PRAGMATIC NUCLEAR STRATEGY: The purpose of Indian Nuclear Strategy is to loosen the doctrinal rigidity in the American, Russian and Chinese strategic thoughts. A close observer of the U.S. defense debate of 1970s and 1980s could not help but notice that the doctrinal rigidity has characterized different schools of American strategic thoughts. Strategic theory is nothing if it is not pragmatic. Strategy is a how to do it study, a guide to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently.

INDIAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY: The primary goal of Indian nuclear strategy is to deter the maritime and aerospace invasions by NATO and United States. Indian nuclear strategy is a pragmatic geopolitical enunciation of the role of the Hindu land power in the coming age of Civilizational wars and religious wars, to deter the nuclear strikes of Catholic and Protestant maritime powers. India reserves the right to make preemptive nuclear strikes against hostile naval targets, including aircraft carrier fleets to deter the aggression of preponderant maritime powers.

ALL ARE RANK AMATEURS: No one has any hands-on knowledge of bilateral nuclear war- all are rank amateurs. Everything that we believe, about what has or has not deterred, by nuclear weapons, depends on inferential, deductive reasoning. Students of warfare realize that there is no single source of authority on the nuclear strategy subject. The idea that there may only one correct strategic theory is inimical to contemporary liberal scholarship, and exists in occidental scriptures only.

THREAT OF CATHOLIC STRATEGIC FUNDAMENTALISM: Among the worst sins committed by policy-contending defense analysts is an ability to listen to the arguments of the “other side.” Hindu nuclear doctrine differs from Christian nuclear doctrines. India will adopt and modify United States’ military doctrines to develop Indian strategic doctrine to protect Hindu civilization. The difference in strategy is the direct result of difference in Christian and Hindu world-view. The Christianity is a monotheistic religion, which unlike polytheistic ones cannot easily assimilate additional deities. Catholics see the world in dualistic, us-and-them terms. Christianity is a universalistic, claiming to be the one true faith to which all humans can adhere. It is a missionary religion believing that their adherents have an obligation to convert nonbelievers to that one true faith. From its origin, whenever the opportunity existed the Christianity also expanded by conquest. Christianity, along with Judaism, has teleological views of history in contrast to the cyclical or static views prevalent in other civilizations. The twelfth-century Christian passion has caused long terms conflicts. The Christian passion flow from the nature of the religion and the civilization based on them. The Protestants believe in the separate realms of God and Caesar. Catholicism seeks to unite the realms of God and Caesar, and did so during dark ages. The concepts of Crusade, monotheism, missionary zeal, Christian passion, teleological and apocalyptic views distinguish it from other major world religions of Hinduism and Buddhism. Hindu nuclear strategy explores common grounds with the Buddhist nuclear strategy. Hindu strategy seeks to exploit Catholic-Orthodoxy religious war, to influence Russian nuclear strategy to develop a common Hindu-Orthodoxy-Buddhist strategy to meet the growing threat of the preponderant Catholic-Protestant-Sunni alliance in the coming age of civilizational wars. Hindu and Buddhist civilizations account for half the population of the world.

Indian Concept of Deterrence:

CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE: Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. The United States designed the Cold War nuclear strategy to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in the modern history. The post-Cold War nuclear deterrent strategy has following objectives. (1) To deter conventional and nuclear attack on India by external forces ranging from the armed forces of hostile nations, to deter the threats from NATO, the United States and China. (2) To deter preemptive nuclear strikes from rogue nations that includes Pakistan. (3) To deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction among Islamic nations. To support the counter-proliferation measures to denuke the Islamic nuclear bomb and to denuke rouge states. (4) To deter the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in military conflict. (5) To justify the use of tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear torpedoes, and nuclear nukes against naval targets at High Sea, to deter entry and the invasion of hostile Navy and aircraft carrier fleets in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea.

ENDURING PRINCIPLES IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY: India should clarify its position on enduring principles that support deterrence strategy.

NATIONAL INTERESTS: India must define its national interests so as to know whom its wishes to deter from doing what to whom, by what means, and under what circumstances.

CREDIBILITY: Deterrence can succeed only if the combination of threat and incentive is credible. The Indian military force invoked as part of the deterrence action must be clearly capable of achieving the promised military objectives.

COMMUNICATION & PERCEPTIONS: India must take explicit steps to avoid misconceptions or miscommunications. The cultural blind spots of adversaries can cause the miscommunications of the nuclear strategy. India should adopt the military terminology used by the United States to express Indian Nuclear Strategy to avoid miscommunications. Indian doctrine shall communicate clearly in American English, the actions desired from the object of deterrence- the Deterred- and the consequences of the failure of deterrence, in the language the recipient of the communications will understand.

INTELLIGENCE: India should develop enhanced intelligence sources and the evaluators of intelligence data. The intelligence analysis helps the timely implementation of the deterrence actions.

POLICIES OF THE ROLE AND USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: The US Navy states: “Most agree that the threat of nuclear weapons use is appropriate, to deter the threat or use of nuclear weapons against USA and also against allies protected by the US shield most of who do not have nuclear holdings. Nuclear weapons will remain a cornerstone of U.S. national security.” (p.4)

STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCE: The SSBN is a very important element of the nuclear retaliatory force. The qualities that make SSBN valuable are its essential invulnerability, its stealth, and its ability to change operational areas at will and its long time on station. The Indian SSBN forces should contribute significantly to the conventional offensive capability of the Indian Navy.

PERCEPTION LEVEL OF UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE: Cold War deterrence sought to convince its major opponent that a particular action would elicit a response resulting in unacceptable damage that would outweigh any likely benefit. United States generally underestimated the level of damage and perhaps underestimated the kind of damage that the North Vietnamese and Serbia would consider ‘unacceptable’- a result that has relevance to that concept today. Pakistan may not consider loss of few cities as unacceptable, but would consider the loss of its women and selective execution of its Punjabi male population as unacceptable. Pakistani Army might conspire to ware a preemptive nuclear strike against India to maintain Punjabi domination in Pakistan. Indian response to blowup Karachi would promote Punjabi domination in Pakistan, hence would make Punjabi Army happy. Therefore, if Indian doctrine declares that it would hang every Punjabi male in Pakistan, but would not harm other minorities, then it would deter Pakistan’s preemptive strikes against India.

ROLE OF VALUE SYSTEMS IN DETERRENCE: The adversary’s value system determines the importance, the adversary attaches to the action, to be deterred. Ruling elite of the Adversary’s value system identifies his most valued assets, and explains the role of the prejudices, misconceptions and calculations. The threat to destroy the real estate and infrastructure would not deter an Islamic nuclear rogue nation. Indian threat to hang every Punjabi male, Hindu occupation of Punjabi women and property would deter Pakistani preemptive nuclear strike against India. It would also encourage the non-Punjabi soldiers to arrest Punjabi military and civilian leaders. The DNA doctrine will tear apart the social fabric of Pakistan and undermine Punjabi domination in Pakistan.

PERCEPTION BIAS AFFECTS DETERRENCE: Cultural and perceptual blind spots present a danger in developing a strategy involving deterrence. India must overcome cultural bias that colors the views of Indians about others including the views of its leaders about others. The adversary may be more willing to sacrifice human life to achieve certain goals. The adversary may be willing to suffer more damage than we do in a similar situation. The adversary may hold dear things that we do not and vice versa. Unfortunately the cultural and perceptual blind spots usually become apparent only after a disaster. India should assume that the rest of the world, including United States, Western Christendom, China, and Pakistan do not think as we do. Western Christendom may be willing to undermine Hindu India to promote a Catholic Prime Minister in India. Pakistan and Afghanistan may be willing to sacrifice human life to expand the frontiers of Islam in India. Atheist Chinese Communist leaders conspiring with the Vatican to undermine Buddhism in China, in exchange for increased Christian representation in the government. United States jumped in Korean War, in retaliation to the Communists overthrowing the Catholic government of Chiang Kaisheik in China. Indian threat to hang all Punjabi men in case of a preemptive nuclear strike will deter Pakistan. The DNA doctrine will deter Pakistan. India may deter China by threatening to support Chinese Buddhism.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DETER WARS: One of the most important assumptions during the Cold War was that nuclear weapons were the most effective deterrent to war between the states of the East and the West. This assumption, carried into the post-Cold War era, however, may promote nuclear proliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons would deter more states from going to war against one another. The nuclear weapons provide weaker states with more security against attack by stronger neighbors. China transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan to deter Indian attacks on the truncated Pakistan. Pakistan has justified its nuclear tests, arguing that it has deterred Indian attack on Pakistan even when Pakistani infiltrators invaded Kargil. The flaw in this reasoning is that it assumes that every state actor shall be rational, and will work against the use of such weapons, and that nuclear arms race will therefore not end in nuclear warfare. The irresponsible statements of Pakistani leadership threatening India with preemptive strikes, even when Pakistan itself was an aggressor, shows that rogue nuclear powers would misuse their nuclear weapon status to invade other nations with conventional arms with impunity.

DETERRENT FAILURE AGAINST TERRORISM: All actions can not be deterred. The threats of substantial damage or destruction fail to deter terrorists. One can deter only when one knows whom to deter. Islamic fundamentalist, Afghan Mujahideens and Muslim drug dealers, and Muslim terrorists will not be deterred by, Indian threats of substantial damage and destruction of Pakistan. Afghan fundamentalists seek to expand the frontiers of Islamic fundamentalism by overthrowing the secular democratic regime in Pakistan and Kashmir. Indian threat to overthrow and replace the Islamic regime in Afghanistan, by a ‘women-only’ government of a secular totalitarian Afghan regime, will scare Islamic fundamentalists into total submission.

9(ii) Nuclear Deterrent against Bio-Weapons

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: How to think about nuclear deterrent against the threat of the biological and chemical weapons as the nuclear powers are unable on moral and treaty grounds, to threaten to reply in kind. Indian Nuclear doctrine should study the potential uses and value of nuclear weapons in deterring attacks on vital Indian interests by states using powerful conventional forces or chemical and biological weapons.

DETERRENCE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: Is it appropriate to invoke the nuclear response to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons. If India is not directly threatened, the use of nuclear weapons against populations who are viewed as distinct from their evil leaders, would likely be deemed inappropriate, no matter what weapons atrocities the leaders perpetrate. Treaty obligations restrict the use of US and Russian stockpile of chemical and biological weapons, which will preclude a response in kind. India should use Nuclear weapons solely to deter the use of nuclear weapons. The use of other weapons of mass destruction should elicit convention-weapons responses.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: United States is likely to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to the use of biological weapons. The US president will make a nuclear response to attack, in case of an actual or potential biological attack that causes thousands of civilian casualties. The biological attack should be by an identified opponent, against the US homeland, or a related vital interest, or the NATO region.

Pakistan is an Irrational Fanatic Rogue Islamic Nuclear Power:

DETERRING INTENSELY HOSTILE NUCLEAR POWER: The danger of a nuclear war is exacerbated by the existence of a few rogue regimes like Pakistan, who appear to want to lead Islamic resurgence and Islamic fundamentalism. Nuclear Pakistan after tasting the victory of Afghan Mujahideens against Russians may use nuclear weapons to establish Islamic dominance in Asia. Pakistan has repeatedly threatened the preemptive nuclear strikes against India. Pakistan does it to spoil the perceived influence of India. The Western world fears that Pakistan may use nuclear weapons in reckless disregard of the costs and dangers involved. The problem of rogue Islamic nuclear power, pose a new kind of problem for the nuclear deterrence: how to deal with a small, intensely hostile, rogue, Islamic nuclear weapon power.

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(0)(1022) 9 (iii) Indian Nuclear Weapons Impacts New Military Tactics

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COUPLING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH OTHER FORCES: Whether India should separate or integrate nuclear and conventional forces? During the Cold War, United States favored the integration of nuclear and conventional forces, mainly on the grounds that such integration helped offset the unfavorable conventional balance. Indian Air Force and Indian Naval Doctrine should promote the integration and coupling of the nuclear and conventional forces. Indian Army should not deploy nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons should be deployed only Air Force and Navy. Nuclear force should be the fourth wing of the Indian Armed Forces, which will deploy nuclear weapons with Air Force and Navy.

EQUALIZER AND EQUALIZEE: After the Cold War United States favors the decoupling nuclear weapons and the conventional forces to limit their use to deterring the use of others’ nuclear weapons, and other’s use of chemical and biological weapons. During Cold War, the Soviet Union enjoyed the superiority in the conventional forces in Europe. Then United States advocated the coupling of the nuclear and conventional forces to offset the Soviet conventional superiority. During Cold War United States used nuclear deterrence to equalize Soviet conventional superiority, then United States was an Equalizer and the Soviet Union an Equalizee. Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union favors the coupling of the nuclear weapons and the conventional forces, to equalize the superiority of the Unites States in the conventional arms. Russia shall become an equalizer, and United States, an equalizee. Russia is abandoning its no-first-use policy to equalize Western superiority in conventional weapons in Europe.

NO FIRST USE: During Cold War, the Soviet Union and China declared the policy of ‘no-first-use’ of nuclear weapons. Then United States was under pressure to adopt a policy of ‘no-first-use’ of nuclear weapons. Recently Russia is wriggling out its commitment of no first use of Nuclear weapons. China is also diluting its commitments towards no-first-use policy. Presently none of the nuclear weapon powers United States, Russia, China, and Pakistan accepts no-first-use policy. Pakistan has repeatedly refused to sign a no first use of nuclear weapons agreement with India. India should apply pressure on Pakistan to sign a no-first-use treaty with Pakistan. India should sign the no first use only with Pakistan. India should not announce a unilateral no-first-use policy. India needs a credible nuclear deterrent to deter the threat of Western aircraft carrier fleets in Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. India needs a credible nuclear deterrent to deter the threats of bombing by United States and NATO Air Forces. India will declare a policy of preemptive nuclear strikes against hostile carrier fleets in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. India will justify the preemptive nuclear strikes against hostile carrier fleets in the Bay of Bengal, as nuclear weapons can be used in ‘defense-of-last-resort’ by weaker countries under mortal attack by powerful military alliances, specially NATO and United States.

NUCLEAR DETERRENT AGAINST AIR ATTACKS: Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared on the anniversary celebrations of May 1998 tests, that the NATO bombardment of the Serbia justifies the exercise of nuclear option by India. It is an explicit Policy statement that India would exercise the nuclear deterrent to deter the invasions by NATO-US Air Force. India will use tactical nuclear weapons to sink the hostile aircraft carrier fleets in the Bay of Bengal and India’s territorial waters. Nuclear India is primarily a land power. The land power needs tactical nuclear weapons to equalize the air and maritime superiority of the Western alliance. In the clash of civilizations, the Hindu civilization is a land power, and it cannot allow maritime and air powers of the Catholic and Protestant civilizations preponderance in South Asia. President Nixon ordered the carrier fleet towards Bay of Bengal during 1971 Indo-Pak war. Nixon and Kissinger threatened India with a nuclear response in case of an Indian attack on Kashmir frontier.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE: ‘Extended deterrence’ refers to the umbrella United States extend over its allies to protect their homelands, as well as its own from attack. The nuclear attack and conventional attack in Europe, by design were not de-coupled, in the US deterrence policy. Extended deterrence serves to obviate the need for the allies to develop nuclear weapons capabilities of their own. In unforeseen, credible threat of an overwhelming conventional attack against a close ally of the United States could arise in future. Such a development could resurrect the Cold War era argument in favor of using nuclear weapons in extremis to respond to massive conventional attack. The potential use of the nuclear weapons by United States as a deterrent against conventional attacks cannot be ruled out, so long as US maintains its extended deterrence posture.

INDIA’S USE OF A-BOMB IN EXTREMIS: India will adopt the United States policy to use tactical nuclear weapons in extremis. India shall resurrect the Cold War argument in favor of using tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear torpedoes in extremis to respond to the massive deployment of Western aircraft carrier fleets in Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. India cannot rule out the use of nuclear torpedoes by submarines, frigates, and tactical nuclear weapons to sink hostile naval fleets. The entry of hostile aircraft carrier fleets in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea justifies the preemptive use of tactical nuclear weapons in extremis response. India will use tactical nuclear weapons to respond to the threat of massive maritime and air attacks by preponderant maritime and air powers of the world. The purpose of the Nuclear Weapons doctrines of a land power is to use nuclear deterrent to equalize the preponderance of the Western powers as Air power and as Sea power. The development of a credible arsenal of nuclear missiles by a land power equalizes the maritime preponderance of the major Sea power and the aerospace preponderance of the major Air power. India will never use nuclear weapons to deter massive land invasions by hostile Army. India will not use nuclear weapons even if it loses a major conventional land war. The Nuclear land power will use tactical nuclear weapons only against maritime naval targets at sea and against military airports, and major aerospace plants. In case NATO bombs Indian civilian, infrastructure and industrial targets then Indian nuclear strikes against aggressors’ metropolitan targets in extremis is justified.

SELF-DETERRENCE: India can be self-deterred from acting by establishing overly strict criteria for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. India should not establish very high thresholds for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, so that their use remains credible against the concentration of hostile naval forces.

DECLARATORY POLICIES: The clear declaration of the deterrence policies is often necessary for deterring a potential adversary. It is necessary for domestic political purposes. It also reassures major nuclear powers. The clear enunciation of deterrence policy sometime exacerbates a situation and stimulates undesirable reactions from prospective opponents. The ambiguity in deterrence policies provides an opening for exploitation or miscalculation by a would-be aggressor. India nuclear deterrence policy shall clearly enunciate the likely use of tactical nuclear weapons against hostile naval targets in Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea during war. Indian DNA doctrine shall clearly enunciate the mandatory execution of the entire male population of the aggressor nation. India as a land power, will use tactical nuclear weapons against hostile aircraft carrier fleets, to equalize the strategic advantages of preponderant maritime and air powers. The clear declaratory deterrence policy is an effective instrument for equalizing the maritime and air superiority of the United States and NATO forces.

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(0)(1022) 9(iv) Counter-Insurgency Warfare Doctrine of Nuclear India

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CITIZEN’S MILITIA TAMES GUERRILLAS: Citizen’s Militia and People’s Army will effectively fight Islamic Mujahideens, Guerrilla wars, and Insurgencies. It shall be a legal obligation of the citizens to provide for the common defense. Avoid using the regular Army units, for counterinsurgency and law and order operations.

MISSION CREEP: The original political objects can alter greatly in the course of the war and may finally change entirely, since they are influenced by the events and their probable consequence, observes Clausewitz. India’s national interests will dictate the pace and extent of its engagements. Judge the costs and risks of Indian military involvement, with the stakes involved. Indian military engagements must target selectively on those areas that most affect India’s national security.

GREAT NATIONS DO NOT FIGHT SMALL WARS: Great nation does not fight a small war, does not mean that great nation did not fight wars that were small, in size. It means that once a great nation gets involved in a war, it is no longer a small war, for the prestige of the great nation is on line. Because the prestige is on line, it is almost impossible for that nation to disengage or to seek a settlement less than battlefield victory.

AMERICAN DEFEAT IN BEIRUT: In July 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. The United States, Italy, and France formed the Multinational Force (MNF), to interpose between warring mission and to oversee the evacuation of PLO troops. On April 18, 1983, a pickup truck loaded with 2,000 pounds of explosives detonated outside the U.S. embassy in Beirut. On May 17, 1983, President Reagan asked MNF to support President Amin Gemayel. On October 23, 1983, the largest non-nuclear explosion ever detonated on the face of the earth, a 12,000 pound bomb wrapped in canisters of flammable gases exploded at the Marine barracks killing 241 US servicemen and wounding another 128. Just over three months later President Reagan announced the withdrawal of the Marines to their ships.

AMERICAN DEFEAT IN MOGADISHU: The Déjà Vu in Mogadishu describes American defeat in Mogadishu, when the U.S. troops withdrew from Somalia in March 1994. President Bush had no intent to be in Somalia with fighting forces. He promised not to dictate political outcomes. He wanted to focus on food distribution only. However, when President Clinton took office in January 1993, he had a more ambitious role in mind. International peacekeeping especially by the UN can and must play a crucial role. Somalia was to be the test case for this new policy. America brushed aside the Bush’s promise not to dictate political outcomes. Nation building as a part of the UN peacekeeping effort was to be the new role for the U.S. forces in Somalia. The neutrality of the U.S. dominated UN force compromised, after confrontations between UN troops and gunmen believed to be supporters of Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. United States envoy ordered a manhunt for warlord Aidid, after his men killed twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers. In the ensuing search, eighteen US servicemen died and seventy-eight wounded in a shoo-out in October 1993. The televised pictures of dead American Rangers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu enraged the American public and prompted a congressional ultimatum for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia. US pulled out all troops before March 31, 1994.

DANGERS OF A HOLLOW MILITARY: Peace-keeping commitments may so degrade the armed forces’ warfighting capability that it will be impossible to carry out national military strategy. If the mismatch of commitments and forces continues to develop then the military will be unable to carry out the strategy. The win/win strategy requires sizing the military for two major regional conflicts. US may have ‘win/win’ strategy, but it may be drawing the Army down to a ‘win/zero’ capability by using Army for law and order purposes. Peacekeeping missions may even undermine the first win.

The same overseas military unit is not deployed permanently. The plans to commit some 34,000 US troops to peacekeeping, would tie down indefinitely around one-fifth of the post-Cold War US Army. This figure is arrived at by applying the three-to-one rule, means that over 100,000 Army troops would be engaged in the peacekeeping, equivalent of between four and five divisions, around one-fifth of the entire post-draw down US Army.

THIRTY YEARS RELIGIOUS WARS: The Catholic Leagues and Protestant Alliances fought the 30 years religious wars and it almost destroyed German people. After 1648, it was widely recognized that military force should not be used to settle religious disputes.

NATURE OF GUERRILLA LEADERSHIP: In the future, limited wars will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will be known by more formal titles. Guerrilla organizations depend on charismatic personalities rather than on institutions. Guerrillas motivate themselves by fanatical, ideology-based loyalties, less by professionalism. It will be clearly subject to some kind of leadership with coercive powers at its disposal, but the leadership will be hardly distinguishable from the organization as a whole. It will be rooted in a population base of some sort. If the state decide to fight the guerrillas then it will have to win quickly and decisively.

RESPONSE OF THE ARMY: First, since the guerilla leaders fight for an ideological cause, they do not change their loyalties. Therefore, either imprison all guerrillas or kill them, as no propaganda would transform them into law-abiding citizens. The regular army should use spies and bribery to secure the arrest of the top leaders of the guerrilla armies. Imprison guerrilla leaders should be awarded long-term imprisonment in solitary confinement. Arrest the families of the guerrilla leaders should also be arrested, to force the surrender of guerrillas.

Second, in guerrilla warfare there is no distinction between soldiers and civilians. Third, guerrilla armies will be unable to control large, contiguous pieces of territories. The difference between war-front and rear of the enemy will progressively break down. Fourth, the practice of capturing civilians and even entire community for ransom will make a comeback. Fifth, the guerrilla war will also destroy cultural monuments, works of art, churches etc. The religious institutions will fail to enjoy immunity, and will become prime targets. Capturing enemy’s religious symbols will constitute a high road to victory. The loss of the religious symbols to enemy will become a cause and proof of defeat. During religious wars, the first thing a Protestant force did to a captured city was to drive out the bishops, smash the statues, and cleanse the churches. Sixth, the guerrilla war will not make the distinction between private and public property. Seventh, the existing distinction between war and crime will break down in the guerrilla warfare. Eight, the guerrillas will intermingle with the population, and the guerrilla wars may be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres. The military objective of the large territorial-control is no longer the goal of the guerrilla army. Guerrillas enforce a kind of population control by a mixture of propaganda and terror.

Ninth, the most effective way of defending a society against guerrilla wars is Citizen’s Militia. The Citizen’s Militia should take over the law and order functions in the guerrilla infested areas. The Government should arm the community under the attack of guerrillas, at its expense. Tenth, if the growing militancy of one religion continues, it will compel others to follow suit. People will defend themselves under the banner of some great powerful idea. The Idea may be secular by origin, but when it is fought cause it to acquire religious overtones and it is adhered to like a religious fervor. The Muhammed’s recent revival may cause the revival of the Christian Lord, who will be a lord of battles. Eleventh, the guerrillas wage wars for the souls of men. Guerrilla Wars normally not fought for territorial aggrandizement. Political guerrillas wage wars to acquire political power. Religious fundamentalist guerrillas wage wars to install religious leaders in positions of political power. Twelfth, the guerrilla wars fought for the quest for women and sexual gratification will become common. In many of the guerrilla wars waged in developing countries this is already true and has indeed always been true. Thirteenth, the regular forces will fight more effectively against guerrilla armies if they take their rewards directly from the enemy, by looting the enemy properties.

CHEAP AIRCRAFT FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE: During World War II the United States produced up to 100,000 aircraft in a single year. The expensive aircraft are not cost-effective against guerrilla enemy. Many of the expensive crew operated weapons are dinosaurs and are doomed to disappear.

THREAT OF ISLAMIC CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISM: The Islamic Christian conflict also stems, from their similarities. Both are monotheistic religions, which unlike polytheistic ones cannot easily assimilate additional deities. Both see the world in dualistic, us-and-them terms. Both are universalistic, claiming to be the one true faith to which all humans can adhere. Both are missionary religions believing that their adherents have an obligation to convert nonbelievers to that one true faith. From its origins in Arabian Peninsula, Islam expanded by conquest. Whenever the opportunity existed Christianity also expanded by conquest. The parallel concepts of Jihad and Crusade not only resemble each other, but also distinguish these two faiths from other major world religions of Hinduism and Buddhism. Islam and Christianity, along with Judaism, also have teleological views of history in contrast to the cyclical or static views prevalent in other civilizations. The twelfth-century Christian passion and twentieth-century Muslim fundamentalism causes long terms conflicts. The Christian passion and Islamic fundamentalism flow from the nature of the two religions and the civilizations based on them. The Muslim concept of Islam as a way of life transcending and uniting religion and politics, cause wars. The Protestants believe in the separate realms of God and Caesar. Catholicism seeks to unite the realms of God and Caesar, and did so during dark ages.

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(0)(1023) Chapter 10: Cold War Era American Warfare Doctrines

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(i) New Wars in New Age

INDIA WILL ADOPT U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINES: Generals of every nation who have read and studied the art of war are certain to evolve varying conceptions of war and radically different military doctrines. The Generals of nuclear weapon powers should avoid the utter confusion, accidental wars, and fatal dispersion of deterrence, by using military terms that are confusing or have dual meaning. The confusion occurs when the military doctrines of the commanders of the hostile army or fleet, use military terms that have confusing or different meaning in different cultures. The military communications between adversaries, exercising nuclear deterrent should be done in English using the vocabulary and terms used in US military manuals describing the post-Cold War Nuclear strategy. India should adopt the theory and practice of United States nuclear deterrence, and diplomacy currently in force, to avoid any misunderstanding of diplomatic terms used in the nuclear brinkmanship.

POST COLD WAR US MILITARY DOCTRINES: Nuclear India should develop its military doctrines after studying the post-Cold War military doctrines of the United States Army, Navy and Air Force. Indian defense forces should use the terms used in the following documents: (i) March 1992 edition of Air Force Manual 1-1, entitled Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. (ii) September 1992 Navy and Marine Corps White paper, “. From the Sea,” subtitled “preparing the Naval Services for the 21^st Century.” (iii) Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, “Joint Pub1,” published in 1991 and FM 100-5, Operations. Indian military doctrine will enhance its deterrent if it expresses its goals, objectives, and the need to use conventional force in the language used by U.S. Armed Forces.

NEW STRATEGIC WORLD ORDER: A New World Order in world’s strategic military environment is unquestionably at hand. For the first time since the days of the Roman Empire, there is a single dominant world power. Unlike the Roman Empire, which dominate only Europe and the Mediterranean basin, America has the military power to dominate the entire world. The most important strategic question today is, will the U.S. turn imperialistic and use that power to dominate the world? The US military doctrines are tailor-made to create Pax Americana and Global American Empire. Nuclear India will co-opt the post-Cold War, American military doctrine, to evolve Indian military doctrines, to reorganize Indian Armed Forces. It always pays to copy the military doctrine of the victor.

NEW KIND OF WAR IN EVERY AGE: Every age has its own kind of war, with its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions. The intent of the geopolitics is not to provide a manual for action, but rather to provide a thinking political and military leader with a frame of reference. Policy is the guiding intelligence and War only the instrument, not vice versa. The policy determines the conduct of war. Policy should know the instrument it means to use. Wise Policy shall not make demands on war which war cannot fulfil.

AMERICAN CATHOLIC EMPIRE IN PHILIPPINES: America’s first military intervention abroad in the Philippines began on a religious note. President William McKinley said publicly that divine guidance influenced his decision to send American troops to the Philippines in 1898. He had paced the floor of the White House nightly, even pausing to beg ‘almighty god for light and guidance.” Then suddenly on night a list of options appeared. “His only choice was to take the Philippine archipelago and to educate the Filipino, and uplift and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow men for whom Christ had died.” (Col Harrey G. Summers Jr. The New World Strategy, p.24.) It appears that United States fought the Kosovo War to promote the religious interests of the Vatican. More than 600,000 Filipinos were massacred by American troops, before Filipino became an American colony.

Interventionist Doves

INTERVENTIONIST DOVES: The Left isolationists had always taken it as a matter of faith that the military was the cause of all evil. The US intervention in Grenada was wrong, as one can not bring in democracy at the point of a bayonet. There has been a post-Cold War emergence of interventionist doves after Bosnia. Suddenly the more fervent doves became the most ardent advocates of U.S. military intervention against Serbs. Air strikes in particular became their foreign policy initiative of choice. “The anomaly is that the less these interventionist doves know about the military and military weaponry and its effects, the more convinced they are that military action in itself will be decisive. The interventionist doves see the military as a kind of Deus ex machine, literally, “God from a machine”. It was the ancient Greco-Roman dramatic device of lowering “God” by stage machinery drawn at the end of a play to sort out complications in the plot.” (New World Strategy, p.38). In India socialists scuttled Indian military doctrines and expunged it of all Strategic Offensive and made it totally strategic defensive.

Clausewitz's Trinitarian War

TRINITARIAN WAR: War is a total phenomenon, and its dominant tendencies make it a remarkable trinity; first concerns the people, the second concern the commanders and the third concerns the government. One of Clausewitz’s most important insights is “remarkable trinity,” now known as Trinitarian War.

COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORIES: The counterinsurgency theorists of 1960s rejected the role of conventional wars, claim that Clausewitz has no relevance in the post-Cold War world. Keegan in History of Warfare (1993) writes that “culture is as powerful a force as politics in the choice of military means and often more likely to prevail than political or military logic.” The wars of the future shall promote cultural interests. To perceive war as the continuation of politics is incomplete. The end of interstate war is not at hand.

CLAUSEWITZIAN UNIVERSE IS OBSOLETE: Creveld in “The Transformation of War” argues, that Trinitiarian War was a thing of the past, and Clauzewitzian world-picture is either obsolete or wrong. Van Creveld argues that world is entering an era of warfare between ethnic and religious groups. There are solid military reasons, why modern regular forces are all but useless for fighting religious wars, which is fast becoming the dominant form of war in our age. Clausewitzian Universe is rapidly becoming out of date and can no longer provide us with a proper framework for understanding war.

CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: Samuel Huntington argues that the fundamental source of conflict in the New World and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. However, the nation states will remain the most powerful actors in the world affairs.

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: For the United States, the Persian Gulf Wart was a return to the Trinitarian war model. The Persian Gulf war was a shared effort of the American people, their government, and their military. The live coverage of the CNN networks guaranteed its success as the Trinitarian War. United States lost the Vietnam War because it was like the eighteenth-century war, where war was a matter for governments alone and the people’s role was merely that of an instrument. President Bush asked the Congress for permission to wage war against Iraq. After three days of debate, on January 12, 1991, the Congress voted President Bush authority to go to war. America was back on the Trinitarian war track.

TRINITARIAN WAR PRECLUDES UNITED NATIONS: Even when the nature of threat may not be Trinitarian, the nature of the U.S. response must be in accord with the Trinitarian realities of the American System. The Trinitarian wars need not secure the consent of the United States. The United States will undertake future military operations without consulting the United Nations. American public and media will support every military venture of the President of the United States.

Media & War

MEDIA AND TRINITARIAN WAR: The media serves a crucial role in the formulation, interpretation, and execution of nation’s military policy, and provides the Trinitarian linkages among the military in the field, the people, and the government. The networks and CNN is very useful in promoting the public perceptions of the military’s professionalism. The military is no longer the faceless automatons, that could be committed to battle at the whim of the politicians, without concern for public opinion. The media coverage and consequent public reaction to the deaths of 241 U.S. servicemen in the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983, led to the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Lebanon. The media coverage of October 3, 1993 incident in Mogadishu, Somalia, when two U.S. helicopters were shot down and eighteen U.S. servicemen were killed in the ensuing gun battle. It outraged the American people, when pictures of an American soldier’s body being dragged trough the streets were shown on television and published in newspapers. The media coverage forced a change in the US policy. The picture was not just the dragging of an American body through the streets of Mogadishu, but the TV pictures symbolized the American power itself dragged through the Third World. It symbolized American has failed to master the challenges of the post-Cold War era. It is an illusion to say that American media is independent. No major network opposed the NATO bombings of Serbia. It raises a warning that United States media could become anti- India in future. In case of any threat from the United States, India should follow the example of Somalia and Lebanon and cause massive damage to the United States Army personnel. India should inflict heavy and sensational damage to cause a media spectacle, to cause public outrage in the United States against any military foolhardiness against India. United States never planned to invade Iran, because of the news coverage of the Iranian torture of US embassy personnel in Iran during Carter era.

PAX SINICA: China has been in decline under Manchu conquerors, whose Ch’ing Dynasty ruled China from 1644 to 1912. In 1884, a Chinese philosopher, K’ang Yu-wei, wrote a treatise that had widespread influence throughout East Asia and was even hailed by Mao Zedong. Called “Ta T’ung Shu” (The Great Utopia), it laid out a blueprint for the future which forecast NATO and the OAS almost exactly, and included a grand alliance between China and Japan.

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(0)(1023) Ch. 10 (ii) Nuclear Weapon Doctrines of American Presidents

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MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATIES: The United States entered into a number of formal and informal mutual defense agreements during the cold War, but when they outlived their usefulness they were quietly abandoned. The mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan was unilaterally abrogated by the United States. India should not worry about hostile treaties signed by the United States. Indian diplomacy shall sabotage these hostile treaties, so that the United States abandon them.

Vietnam War

ABANDONMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM: The United States had promised, that United States would militarily intervene if North Vietnam renewed its aggression. It was a precondition for South Vietnamese agreement to the 1973 Paris Peace Accord. It was officially the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. However, when two years later in 1975, in a flagrant violation of those accords, North Vietnam launched its multi-division cross-border invasion of the South, the United States shamefully abandoned its ally.

Eisenhower Doctrine

EISENHOWER DOCTRINE: In 1953, President Eisenhower announced the Eisenhower Doctrine. With the Eisenhower doctrine, the US pledged help to any Middle East country in defending against outside aggression. President Eisenhower sent 14,000 U.S. troops into Lebanon in 1958 to defend against Iraqi-sponsored aggression. President Eisenhower even threatened the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq.

Nixon Doctrine

NIXON DOCTRINE: In 1969 President Nixon established Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia as the “twin pillars” of U.S. security interests in the Middle East. The Shiite Iranian pillar collapsed in 1979. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and fundamentalist Mullahs overthrew shah of Iran. France and the CIA engineered the fall of Shah of Iran. President Carter ordered the overthrowing of the Shah of Iran because Shah had planned to industrialize Iran. Then the GNP of Iran would have surpassed the GNP of France and Britain in next 3 years. Iran was also promoting Asian Common Market that included Iran, India, and Pakistan. Shah of Iran was the most enlightened Islamic ruler of the world. Tehran was as modern as Paris was, during the times of Shah of Iran. Shah promoted the pre-Islamic Persian heritage. Without the direct involvement of President Carter, Ayatollah Khomeini could not become the ruler of Iran. President Carter scuttled all democratic alternatives to the Monarchy, and scuttled the conspiracy of the Generals to capture power. It was a long-term policy of President Carter to undermine the leading Aryan power in South Asia. It was a Vatican’s conspiracy to overthrow a liberal Islamic regime in Iran. The fall of the Shah of Iran was the most important event in the Islamic world that gave rise to Islamic Fundamentalism, and President Carter and the Vatican were responsible for it. By engineering the fall of Shah of Iran, President Carter and the Holy Pope became the founding fathers of the Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s. Because of the fall of enlightened Shah of Iran, and the failure of Indira Gandhi to support him in the times of his dire need, that the world is entering into the age of civilizational wars and religious wars. President Carter implemented the policy to overthrow Shah of Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini was a CIA spy. Ayatollah Khomeini reminds about Osama Bin Ladin, the Saudi billionaire who had been trained by CIA and who is determined to overthrow the Saudi Arabian monarchy. Just as President Nixon promoted China as the world power, similarly President Carter laid the foundation of the Islamic fundamentalism. Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the occupation of American Embassy in Tehran to destroy the evidence of his being a CIA spy. President Carter did not use force to force the release of embassy personnel, because it would have harmed his protégé Ayatollah Khomeini.

Carter Doctrine

CARTER DOCTRINE: In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In January 1980, President Carter announced the Carter Doctrine. It stated, “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region, will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States.” To implement his doctrine, the US forced the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) to coordinate, command and control any military action required. On 1983, President Ronald Reagan renamed the RDJTF as the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), on a par with the European Command (EUCOM) and the Pacific Command (PACOM) as one of the several geographic commands under which US military is organized. President Bush ordered CENTCOM in August 1990 to turn back Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Carter Doctrine is a proof that President Carter had ordered the overthrow of Shah of Iran. Carter Doctrine laid the foundation of the alliance of the United States, CIA, the Vatican and Islamic Fundamentalism.

Wars of National Liberation

THIRD WORLD IN AMERICAN STRATEGY: In January 1961 Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev shifted the venue of great power rivalry to the Third World, seeking to counter US nuclear superiority at the time. Khrushchev announced Soviet support for Wars of National Liberation. President Kennedy bought the challenge. The great power rivalry played out, in Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. The 1994 Army War College study states, with the collapse of Communism in Europe and the demise of the Soviet Union, the Second World has ceased to exist. With the end of the Cold War, the Third World became the centerpiece of American security strategy. The United States was involved in the following Third World problems in Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and North Korea. India shall again re-invent the alliance of the Non-Aligned Nations Movement counter the military superiority of the United States. The collapse of the East Asian and South East Asian Economies enhances the geopolitical role of the Non-Aligned Nations of Africa and South America.

Escalation Dominance

THEORY OF ESCALATION DOMINANCE: The mission of the Armed Forces is to fight and win the nation’s war. The armed forces must maintain escalation dominance. War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action starts, which must lead in theory to extremes. The combat power has two interlocking dimensions, physical strength, and political will. If escalation dominance is to be effective, the adversary must be convinced that we not only have the physical means to escalate the conflict but also the political will to do so. India should maintain escalation dominance over Pakistan. India should threaten to occupy Gwadhar Island.

Nuclear Escalation Dominance

NUCLEAR ESCALATION DOMINANCE IN KOREAN WAR: There is now extensive documentary evidence to show that the use of atomic weapons became an integral part of the Eisenhower administration’s planing designed to force a military solution in Korea. The Chinese and North Koreans were intimidated by the threatened use of atomic weapons, leading to their capitulation in June 1953, and their signing of the Armistice Agreement the following month, said Rosemary Foot in The Wrong War (1985). Eisenhower was able to muster the political will to threaten escalation to nuclear war because in 1953 the moral revulsion against the use of nuclear weapons was not as strong as it is today. The US government and military view the Nuclear weapon as usable tools of war. Another major reason was that the United States had clear escalation dominance over North Korea and China, which at that time did not have the nuclear capability to respond in kind. (New World Strategy, p.87) North Korea learnt the lesson, that it should not fight a war with the United States unless it has Atom Bombs. Korean peninsula would be theater of a major war in the first half of the next decade.

Bush's Nuclear Threat

PRESIDENT BUSH USED NUCLEAR THREAT: In the Persian Gulf War, President Bush warned that the United States would escalate that conflict to the nuclear level if the Iraqis used chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons against the allied coalition. It proved to be an effective deterrent. Bush was able to override the public aversion to the use of nuclear weapons because Saddam Hussain had threatened the first use of such weapons of mass destruction. If the enemy breaches the nuclear, biological, chemical thresh-hold, the United States will respond in kind.

CLINTON’S NUCLEAR THREAT TO N. KOREA: In July 1993, President Clinton threatened to respond with all means necessary (the generally understood euphemism for nuclear weapons) against North Korea, if that country breached the nuclear thresh-hold. In 1994, North Korea issued a veiled threat to turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into a sea of flames, then the United States promised certain retaliation. India should develop military and economic relations with North Korea, whenever the North Korea’s relationship with China becomes sour. Indian military bases in North Korea will reestablish Buddhism in Korea.

NUCLEAR THREAT IN VIETNAM WAR: A nuclear planning group was organized by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam in 1967 to explore the use of nuclear weapons to break the North Vietnamese siege of Khe Sanh. As early as 1954, the US ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina to break the siege of Dien Bien Phu. Senator Barry Goldwater suggested the first use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam during his 1964 bid for the presidency.

ESCALATION OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY: It was the escalation dominance not of offensive nuclear capabilities but of U.S. defensive nuclear capabilities, that the Soviet Union became overextended to the point of practical bankruptcy. The Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI) enhanced deterrence by injecting greater uncertainties into Soviet estimates of their ability to achieve their military objectives should they attempt a first strike. The Soviet attempts to counter the Star Wars initiatives were a major factor in their dissolution.

DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD): After the 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States adopted the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Both the United States and the USSR maintained sufficient nuclear weapons to ensure that they could ride out a first strike by the other side and still have enough remaining strength to respond in kind. The fact is that MAD worked and it avoided the nuclear war. Even with the START I & II and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the fact of Nuclear Russia remains as relevant as before. Russia remains one country in the world with the means to destroy the United States in 30 minutes in a single devastating attack. As a result of January 1994 agreement, between President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin, both United States and Russia have completed the re-targeting of strategic missiles away from points inside Russia and United States respectively. However, it can not be actively verified. In any case re-targeting by either side can take place quickly.

FLAWS OF MASSIVE RETALIATION DOCTRINE: The MAD doctrine could offer the both leader only two choices, either the initiation of a general nuclear War or compromise and retreat. The true course of future war was the Eisenhower administration’s strategy of “Massive Retaliation, in which almost total reliance for national security was placed on nuclear weaponry. This nuclear strategy left the U.S. Army uncertain of its place in the policy and strategy, uncertain that civilians recognized a need even for Army’s existence. Army was therefore uncertain of the service’s whole future. The MAD doctrine fails to deter Pakistan.

Usable Nuclear Weapons

NUCLEAR WEAPONS USABLE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR: The 1954 edition of United States Army Manual FM 100-5 stated Army’s nuclear doctrine, that nuclear weapons represented “additional firepower of large magnitude.” That was the way Eisenhower evidently saw them when he threatened their use in North Korea and against Iraq in Lebanon. Indian Nuclear Doctrine states that the tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear Nukes, nuclear torpedoes are usable instruments of war against hostile aircraft carriers and military bases. India should adopt the 1954 edition of US Field Manual, FM 100-5 version. It states that tactical nuclear weapons represented additional firepower of large magnitude for use against hostile aircraft carriers in the high seas to prohibit their entry into the territorial waters in the times of war. India is a land power, and it can not allow the hostile aircraft carriers, the opportunity to bombard India’s coastal towns. India would use nuclear nukes against Diego Garcia, Guam, Puerto Rico, or Hawaii in case of a threatened NATO bombing raids against Indian targets. India shall reserve its rights to use tactical nuclear weapons against hostile Navy. India will respond by nuclear torpedoes for any threatened Naval or air invasions of mainland India.

Flexible Response

A-BOMBS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DIPLOMACY: Distracting the United States with its sponsorship of “Wars of National Liberation.” The Soviets reached and then exceeded nuclear parity with the United States. A Mexican standoff ensued when one side’s nuclear arsenal cancelled out the other. Then atom bombs evolved from weapons of war to the instruments of diplomacy. The nuclear weapons are useful primarily to deter their use by other nuclear-armed nations. Now the Russian nuclear Sword of Damocles no longer hangs over America’s head. In case of any NATO threats to India, Indian nuclear sword of Damocles will start hanging over American head, to deter United States.

General Wars

GENERAL CONVENTIONAL WAR: The General conventional wars are marked by the total destruction of the enemy’s armed forces, the occupation of his homeland, his unconditional surrender, and the trial and execution of his leaders. Final Punic war was a general conventional war. Rome defeated Carthage, slaughtered the population, razed the city, plowed under the ruins, and sowed the furrow with salt. Spanish invasions of North and south America was a general convention war, as white Christians slaughtered the native Indian population, destroyed Indian civilization, culture, religion, languages and imposed Christianity and Spanish language on them.

JEWS WARS OF EXTERMINATION: “Milchemet Mitzvah was a war of extermination in the fullest sense of the term. The Israelites who engaged in it were put under strict obligation to spare nobody and nothing. Men, women, and children as even non-human living being such as asses and cattle were put to sword. Prophet Moses defeated and killed Midjanite kings together with all other adult males, and their cities burnt. All male children and all women other than virgins were also killed. Prophet Moses, Joshua, and David massacred the defeated peoples. Christians also believed in the extermination of the entire communities, as happened during thirteenth-century Albigensian Crusade. When the Christians took Jerusalem in 1099, they massacred the population until the streets ran with blood and the horses waded in gore up to their ankles. Richard Lionheart had the garrison of Saint Jean d’Acre massacred in 1191. Campaigning in South and Central America Spaniards and Portuguese acted in the name of Cross, they gave the Indians the option to converting to Christianity, exterminating them when they failed to understand or comply.

Slaughters in Holy Wars

For almost a century and a half after Luther first nailed his Ninety-Five Theses to the Church door at Wittenberg, Catholics and Protestants vied each other in their calls for Holy War. They were often slaughtering such populations as happened to disagree with their respective views of Christ’s nature. Whatever we think of the American attempt to save democracy in Vietnam, probably it was not so different from King Philip II of Spain’s attempt to save the souls of his Dutch subjects from the Protestant heresy infecting them.” (M.V. Creveld: The Transformation of War. 1991, p 137-39). The Catholic Croatia used military force to expel all Orthodox Serbs. The NATO invasions of Kosovo, was a Conventional General War. It resulted in the ethnic cleansing and the indictment of the defeated enemy as the war criminal. In the coming age of civilizational wars, most of the wars will be general conventional wars. The Doctrine of Depopulation of Nuclear Aggressor (DNA) will respond to any preemptive nuclear strike against India, as general conventional war, that will result in the mandatory execution of the entire male population of the aggressor.

Limited Wars

LIMITED WARS: The US Army’s 1954 doctrinal manual, defines Limited War as a war of limited objective, that did not require total submission of the enemy. Limited War seeks to realize the objectives the war set out to achieve and a return of peace. The nuclear–era Army’s 1962 manual dropped the concept of “Wars of Limited Objectives” and introduced instead the concept of “Wars of Limited Means.” In the Wars of Limited Means, the essential objective of the military forces is to end the conflict rapidly and decisively in a manner best calculated to avert general nuclear war. The Wars of limited means surrenders the advantage of escalation dominance.

The 1986 edition of the army’s strategic doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-1, The Army, defined limited War as armed conflict between two or more nations, at an intensity below that of general war, where means and/or ends are constrained. There was a major emphasis on war’s political ends. Since war is primarily a politically directed act for political ends. The political objectives define the conduct of war, in terms of strategy and constraints. The political purposes and military goals define and limit the scope and intensity of war. India should not fight the wars of Islamic fundamentalism as a limited War. India should fight the wars of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan, Algeria, Lebanon, and Central Asia as general conventional wars.

Using Tactical Nuclear Weapons

USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS: When the Cold War drew to an end, in 1989, the United States Army discarded the fallacious idea that the purpose of Limited war is to avoid nuclear war. This fallacious idea had led to the U.S. loss of escalation dominance. The manual FM 100-1, The Army (1986) states, “the restrained use of nuclear or chemical weapons, or enemy use of biological weapons, is possible in limited wars.” The United States did indeed threaten escalation to the nuclear level during the 1990-91 limited war in the Persian Gulf. Indian nuclear weapons doctrine will state that “the restrained use of tactical nuclear weapons or tactical chemical and biological weapons is possible against enemy aircraft carriers, naval fleets, and military bases, in limited wars”.

People's War

THE PEOPLE’S WAR: Lin Piao used the Chinese civil war strategy of encirclement of the cities from the countryside. People’s war waged by the world countryside in the third world can destroy the world cities of the industrialized world. It can destroy the United States and Western Europe. During the 1960s, the Communist battle cry was “One, Two, Three, Many Vietnams!” India should flare up two or more regional wars in case of India’s confrontations with the United States and NATO.

REVERSAL OF THE DOMINOES: In the final years of the Cold War the communist concepts of wars of national liberation and people’s war were turned against their creators. President Ronald Reagan pledged assistance to freedom fighters in Third World nations seeking to overthrow Marxist governments who were allies of the Soviet Union. United States backed successful insurgencies in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. This reversal of dominoes resulted in the demise of the Cold War. This reversal proved to be containment’s final form. India should destabilize the allies of the United States in Africa, Asia, and South America. India should destabilize Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, Mexico, and Brazil.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DOCTRINE: In 1961, the United States Nuclear Strategy changed to the “Strategy of Flexible Response.” Conventional forces were increased, but it still placed reliance on nuclear weapons at both the strategic and tactical levels. United States was ready to use nucldear weapons against the Soviet Union in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. British nuclear weapon arsenal in 1962 matched the Soviet arsenal of 1956, on the eve of Suez Canal Crisis. It is no accident that Indian astronomers had predicted the threat of destruction of the world in 1962, as the Seven Star System became a single line in October 1962

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(0)(1024) Chapter 11: Cold War Era American Nuclear Warfare Doctrines

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(i) Bipolar Deterrence

BIPOLAR DETERRENCE: In the bipolar world, the West developed a generalized notion of deterrence that sought to prevent the Soviet Union from using force to further foreign policy goals. The Bipolar deterrence developed, by coupling nuclear and conventional forces so that any use of force between the superpowers raised the prospects of escalation and nuclear war. This approach to deterrence was not effective outside the main NATO-Warsaw pact confrontation in Europe.

ENHANCED ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RUSSIA: The disintegration of the Soviet Union has enhanced the political significance of Russian nuclear weapons in the Kremlin. The nuclear arsenal has increasing political significance for Moscow, as nuclear deterrent is one of the few residual military support for its status as a major power, after the serious deterioration of other Russian military capabilities.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS: Boris Yeltsin has ordered the development of the tactical nuclear weapons. Russia has realized the futility of the multi-megaton strategic nuclear weapons in the post-cold War era. The fissile material of multi-megaton bombs can make dozens of tactical nuclear weapons. Big Bombs are dinosaurs of the nuclear age. Dismantle the big bombs, as they are militarily useless. It means that Indian nuclear arsenal matches the big arsenals of the United States and Russia in terms of its lethality. Big bombs are no longer relevant. The Trident II thermonuclear warhead is a miniature bomb, the warhead design is known as W-88, and Chinese spies have stolen the warhead designs from the Las Alamos Labs in New Mexico. India has also tested a 45-kiloton yield thermonuclear warhead on 15 May 1998. India is more advanced than Russia in the tactical nuclear warhead design technology.

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS: So long as the United States and its major allies are not directly threatened, the use of nuclear weapons against populations of adversaries that use biological and bacteriological weapons can not be justified. Populations are distinct from their evil leaders. Use of nuclear weapons will be inappropriate, no matter what weapons atrocities the enemy perpetrates. The US and allied holdings of chemical and biological weapons are prohibited by treaty obligations, precluding a response in kind; such a response would in any case be inappropriate.

NUCLEAR STRATEGY OF PRESIDENTS CARTER & REAGAN: The Cold War bipolar nuclear strategy of the United States for 1970s and 1980s war enunciated in the policy documents of President Carter’s PD-59 and NUWEP, and President Reagan’s NSDD-13. The various issues of the nuclear strategy doctrines are as follows. The five leading nuclear doctrines are: (1) doctrine of mutual assured vulnerability, mutual assured destruction; (2) doctrine of mutual assured vulnerability with targeting flexibility; (3) doctrine of counter-force and counter-control; (4) doctrine of damage limitation for deterrence and coercion; (5) doctrine of damage limitation with defense dominant.

MAD Doctrine:

DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL ASSURED VULNERABILITY: The American strategic posture was designed to hold at risk under all circumstances of attack a very large number of Soviet urban areas and other economic targets believed to be essential to recovery from war. That number was 100 or even more. The American strategic force was designed and sized for extravagant redundancy. Each leg of the strategic triad- Navy, Air Force, and Army- was independently capable of effecting the identified level of damage. However, since the late 1960s, after the Cuban missile crisis, the United States has never had plans that even approximated this idea. The rhetoric of the mutual assured vulnerability was never confused with operational policy.

MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION DOCTRINE (MAD): The politically effective acronym MAD, for mutual assured destruction is not helpful for constructive debate.

Finite Minimum Deterrent

DOCTRINE OF FINITE OR MINIMUM DETERRENCE: This posture and doctrine is often termed one of finite or minimum deterrence. The advocates of a finite deterrence approach to the quality and size of the strategic-force posture are interested in mutual vulnerability not in executing mutual destruction.

Mutual Assured Freeze

MUTUAL ASSURED FREEZE: The idea of the mutual assured vulnerability underpins much of the reasoning in favor of the nuclear freeze. Many proponents of the freeze do not really care about the details of the balance and imbalance or about the issue of exactly what is a candidate to be frozen and what is not to be frozen. In the view of these nuclear freeze proponents; nuclear weapons power, is deterred by the general expectation that their principal urban centers would be devastated by nuclear weapons.

A-bomb not Biblical Flood

NUCLEAR WAR IS NOT CATACLYSMIC BIBLICAL FLOOD: Hindu nuclear doctrine does not view nuclear war in the eschatological terms. Nuclear war is highly unlikely to be the functional equivalent of the cataclysmic biblical floor. Nuclear catastrophe can come in different sizes with very different consequences. Hindu and Buddhist cyclical view of history guarantees that mankind and even civilization will survive a nuclear war.

CONTROLLED NUCLEAR WAR: Indian doctrine believes that any nuclear war even if it starts can be controlled and limited. The opponents of MAD doctrine would not cause nuclear wars of pseudo-guaranteed nature. MAD doctrine guarantees unlimited catastrophe. The other theories, at least holds open the hope of containing the scale of potential damage.

DANGER OF WESTERN WAR-FIGHTING THEORISTS: The greatest risk of a nuclear war will not stem from Soviet, Chinese, Indian and Pakistani leaders who are insufficiently deterred. The Nuclear war will start because of American nuclear war-fighting theorists, who mislead the US President into believing that nuclear weapons are like any other weapons, therefore nuclear weapons are political instrument, which can be used.

DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF HUMAN LOSS: India justifies its exercise of nuclear weapon option, stating that the white European civilization that the present nuclear weapon powers belong to has committed genocide in the past. Atheist Stalin’s Soviet government killed close to 20 million devout Orthodox Christians in 1920s and 1930s. Atheist Maoist Communist China killed more than 50 million devout Buddhists by starvation in 1950s and 1960s. European Catholics massacred over 80 million original inhabitants in North and South America by guns and plague. Protestant Anglo-Saxons killed over 20 million native Americans in nineteenth century by guns, plague and by shooting bison. During 1500 the Native American population was over 90 million roughly about one fourth of the population of the world, more than the population of entire Europe. Indian nuclear deterrent will be exercised to deter any future conspiracy of the White nuclear powers to use nuclear weapons to impose a Malthusian solution of the problem of overpopulated Asia. Brown Hindu Atom Bomb will deter the genocidal tendencies of the White imperialists.

FALLACY OF BALANCE OF TERROR: The nuclear deterrence works because of the balance of terror, because nearly all sensible policy-makers are terrified by the prospects of nuclear war per se. China fear nuclear war not so much for the human and property damage it would cause, as for the risk it will pose to the Communist political control in China.

MAD IS NOT A DOCTRINE OF CHOICE: The MAD doctrine is not a posture and doctrine of choice. There is no choice. This posture and doctrine makes a virtue of necessity. There are no plausible theories offering a reasonable promise of bearable, survivable, recoverable, let alone winnable general nuclear war. But it is possible to design limited nuclear war plans that will not lead to that dire result, if both adversaries follows the dictates of self-interest. There would be an enormous difference between, say 20 million and 120 million fatalities. The nuclear powers could recover from the former, whereas it could not recover from the latter.

INDIA WILL SURVIVE ANY ISLAMIC NUCLEAR ATTACK: Now the world population is going to reach 6 billion. The empty lands of Australia and Canada will compensate for the radioactive contamination of the lands. The world shall survive the nuclear war and the victims will move into Australia and Canada. Limited nuclear war will not be a non-survivable, non-recoverable catastrophe. India will survive and recover from Pakistani and Islamic preemptive nuclear strikes, and would retain enough military capability to conquer the entire Islamic world, and to hang the entire male population of the aggressor nations.

TAMING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS: Nuclear weapon is not a creation of the Devil as Atom Bomb was developed by men only, so men as a creator can also tame it to develop a nuclear strategy with a human face.

SURVIVABILITY OF RETALIATORY FORCES: No adversary should develop the offensive forces that threaten the survivability of the strategic retaliatory forces of the other side. The nuclear powers should not threaten the second-strike retaliatory-force of the adversaries, even if it defines it in very generous terms. The Western capability of hard-target counter-force capability destabilized the bipolar nuclear deterrence, by threatening the Soviet second-strike retaliatory-forces.

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(0)(1024) 11 (ii) American Flexible M.A.D. Nuclear Warfare Doctrine

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MUTUAL ASSURED VULNERABILITY WITH FLEXIBILITY: This second option is the thinking person’s version of the mutual assured vulnerability. Since 1961-62, the SIOP planning provided several preplanned options, albeit very large ones. The societal vulnerability is both a technological fact and desirable as it dampens competitive urges of nuclear arms. It is not opposed to the flexibility in strategic employment planning. It is neutral towards the size and sequencing of targeting options. The Soviet Union though not eager to engage in nuclear combat accepted the concept of mutual assured vulnerability only ambiguously.

PROBLEM OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: Because the ultimate basis of the deterrence stability is the mutual vulnerability, neither adversary should develop ballistic missile defenses to acquire the physical means to limit damage to its homeland.

TARGETING FLEXIBILITY AVOIDS HOLOCAUST: The targeting flexibility is desirable to provide a president with employment options that might serve to restore deterrence in the course of a war without necessarily producing mutual holocaust. Flexibility per se does not solve the U.S. president’s self-deterrence problem. Flexible response doctrine does not contain a persuasive theory of escalation control, let alone dominance. The limited nuclear options are very unlikely to succeed in restoring deterrence.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE ENHANCES DETERRENCE: The flexible response should manifestly exclude counter-force measures against the strategic retaliatory forces of the adversary. Flexible response doctrine is not a war-fighting strategy as it manifestly excludes the ballistic missile defense (BMD), counter-force capability, serious air, and civil defense. The policy of abandoning the counter-force capability may invite a counter-force-dedicated Soviet Union to escalate in search of useful advantage. The counter-force incompetent policy may lead to escalation.

LIMITED NUCLEAR-STRIKE OPTIONS (LNOs): By executing a doctrine of limited nuclear option (LNO) one signal the adversary its determination, by taking action to cross two major thresholds. First, the use of central nuclear forces, and secondly its employment against the homeland of a super power. The Small nuclear-strike options (SNOs) also signal unambiguously a willingness to exercise restraint and would constitute an invitation for the restraint to be reciprocated, by the adversary. Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) will be a part of a political bargaining process rather than constituting military action. The very limited nuclear options (VLNOs) instead of signaling determination will in the eyes of a belligerent, may signal an extreme fear of nuclear war. However, nuclear powers should not engage in competition in risk-taking.

Nuclear Sea Wars

LIMITED NUCLEAR OPTION IN MARITIME WARS: Indian Doctrine advocates the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter the threat of hostile aircraft carrier fleets in the territorial waters. In case of war, India will sink the enemy aircraft carrier fleets, to protect the land power homeland from the maritime and aircraft attacks. India will never use nuclear weapons even to avert a catastrophic defeat in a Land war. Land powers have a right to use nuclear torpedoes and nukes to sink hostile naval fleets, to erode or balance the geopolitical advantage of the maritime powers vis-à-vis land powers, in the littoral sea wars. It would be foolish to begin a limited nuclear war, unless one has on hand a capability for waging, surviving, and recovering from a large nuclear war. Flexible MAD doctrine prefers a nuclear attack on targets at the sea, versus the nuclear attack on targets at inhabited land. Nuclear exchange in a Sea war, against maritime targets at High Sea, is more humane then nuclear holocaust on the land. India should develop the second strike capability, by stockpiling anti-ship missiles to sink all aircraft carrier fleets of the world.

Limited Nuclear Options (LNO)

PERILS OF LNO: The technical requirements for the execution of limited nuclear options plausibly could drive one toward endorsing deployment of very accurate ICBMs, which would be destabilizing because of their counter-force potential. The single warhead missiles using small warheads, creating the least collateral damage, is feasible. In the era of zero-CEP or perfect accuracy LNO, option becomes feasible. Manned bombers and cruise missiles are inherently inappropriate for most LNO/SNO, sub-SIOP nuclear options.

CONTROLLED NUCLEAR WARS: The agreement to some kinds of flexibility may well open the floodgates to theories of controlled nuclear war. This theory the adherents of flexible response doctrine do no endorse. Flexible response is dangerous in the eyes of the classical MAD doctrine. Because it might encourage the mistaken view that nuclear weapons are usable as political instruments and that nuclear war, in some very dire circumstances would be a sensible course to pursue and would remain limited. The endorsement of idea that central nuclear use might remain controlled and limited places it on the upper reaches of a doctrinal-postural slippery slope.

NUCLEAR RESPONSE TO NATO INVASIONS OF SERBIA: Had Serbia nuclear weapons, then it would have used it to bomb the Vatican to signal its response to the destruction of its infrastructure by Catholic and Protestant Air Force. Indian Prime Minister is on record that NATO bombing of Serbia’s infrastructures justifies India’s exercise of its nuclear option. India will exercise LNOs to deter NATO maritime and air attacks on Indian homeland. India supports the flexible MAD doctrine and limited nuclear options.

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(0)(1024) 11 (iii) Offence Dominant US Nuclear Doctrine of Counter-Force & Counter-Control

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PD-59

PRESIDENT CARTER’S PD-59: The PD-59 is the US defense policy during President Carter and President Reagan, during 1970s and 1980s and continues today. Soviet commentators have condemned PD-59 as providing a guide –book for a nuclear war-fighter’s manual. The PD-59 did not provide guidance for a nuclear war-fighter’s manual. PD-59 addressed adequately the question of what prospective damage the Russian and Soviet leaders feared most. It has addressed the vital strategic question of what is most deterring to the Russian leaders. PD-59 decided that the most fearsome threat in Russian anticipation is the attenuation or loss of political control over the Russian Empire at home and abroad. US nuclear strategy during the golden age 1955-1965 produced fascinating fireworks, but the most valuable strategy thought developed in the late 1970s, in PD-59. It developed a SIOP design that reflected a sophisticated view of the distinctively Soviet adversary.

PD-59 FORCED THE POLITICAL DISINTEGRATION OF USSR: Doctrine of Counter-control seeks to threaten the kind of damage that the Soviet Union found most painful to suffer. The Russia fears not so much damage per se, but rather damage of particular kinds. In the Soviet Union, the society is the servant of the state. The Russian leadership fears most for the continuity and effectiveness of its political tenure is almost certainly correct. United States realized during President Reagan’s era that it is possible to force the political disintegration of the Soviet Union.

SECOND-STRIKE COUNTER-FORCE EQUALIZER FOR INFRASTRUCTURE WAR: There is a need to be able to threaten second-strike counter-force missions, that would offset, or more than offset any benefit the Soviet Union might gain from a counter-force first strike. Directly war-supporting industry are prime targets as much as essential military assets. In short, PD-59 justifies infrastructure warfare by massive air strikes, the policy implemented in NATO bombardment of Serb power plants, utilities, bridges, factories, and hospitals. Plainly, the counter-force and counter-control leitmotiv in US nuclear strategy today, is relevant in second-strike threats as well in much more.

COMMUNICATIONS & COMMAND COUNTER-CONTROL: The political control structure is the second most essential asset of the Russian State. The United States should target the means of communications of command from Moscow to the provinces and to the important elements of the secret services. If Russian leaders know that their political system as opposed to their society is targeted, they would then realize that the United States has the capability to deny them victory. It is healthy for the Soviet leadership to be told that it and its means for enforcing domestic and imperial political control are targeted reliably. Should America launch counter-control strikes against Soviet and Chinese communication systems, up-front by preemptive nuclear strikes? Should the counter-control strikes against communications systems, retained as the threat of last resort?

DENYING VICTORY TO THE SOVIET UNION: The countervailing strategy of the second half of the Carter administration was dedicated to the mission of denying victory to the Soviet Union. Russia, it is reasoned will not initiate a war that it is convinced with high degree of assurance it can not win. Weinberger Doctrine states that the idea of denying the Russia achievement of its war aims can not rest on a threat of action against Russian cities.

Countervailing Strategy

COUNTERVAILING STRATEGY AGAINST RUSSIAN ECONOMY: If all else fails, the United States will retain to the last moment, the ability to strike with devastating effectiveness against Soviet economy. Superior strategy is always desirable. The countervailing strategy is very important, as it seeks to exploit distinct Russian vulnerabilities. The United States could never effect a major attack option against Russian economy, because such action will result in a Russian retaliatory strike against the United States.

SELF-DETERRENCE AND COUNTERVAILING STRATEGY: The countervailing strategy neglects the problem of US self-deterrence. What would deter a US president? It is the United States that one feels will move to consider initiating a central nuclear war, for reasons of impending theater defeat, the major deterrence problem will be US rather than Russia.

UNITES STATES WOULD START THE WAR: PD-59 outlined a vision of US counter-force and counter political control activity in the SIOP against Russia. PD-59 ignored the ability to limit damage to the US homeland. The counter force and counter-control strategy is incomplete, at least until the SDI evolves into a weapons program for homeland defenses. The NSDD-13 and subsequent developments under President Reagan have recognized the importance of strategic defense. The massive counter-economic recovery options were not useful for declaratory policy purposes or for operational reasons. The sub-SIOP-level LNOs were relatively uninteresting. The World War III would be either very short or relatively long, perhaps 6 months. Although 6-month wars are possible, 6-day or 6-week wars are no less possible and are no less plausible. During a long duration war, the endurance of strategic forces and National Command Authority would become a problem. PD-59 recognizes the Soviet Union as a culturally distinctive adversary. The United States having broken free at the official level from strategic cultural mirror imaging seems unwilling or unable to proceed logically the required additional mile to identification of the uniquely Soviet aspects of the Soviet Union. The United States has not taken steps to recognize the distinctly US problems.

WHAT CHINA FEARS MOST? PD-59 FOR CHINA: Let us apply the analysis of PD-59 for studying what China fears most. Atheist Communists and Christians are ruling predominantly Buddhist China. Buddhists has been out of power for more than ninety years less than a century. What China fears most is the erosion of mass support for the Communist ideology, due to the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Catholic Church in Poland brought China down. Buddhism and Taoism scared Chairman Mao. Mao denounced Buddhism as India’s Buddhism. Mao commented to Kissinger that Hegel wrongly praised Indian Buddhism while Hegel had criticized Confucius. Marxist materialist dialectics is based on Hegelian dialectics, and China is using Confucius to replace Buddhism. India is a leader of Buddhism and Indian Buddhist missionaries can mobilize Chinese masses. India can effectively devise counter-control strategy to undermine the political control of the Communist party in China. India could overthrow the Communist regime in China without warfare, by means of mass-communication of Buddhist and Taoist scriptures.

WHAT VATICAN FEARS MOST? PD-59 FOR THE VATICAN: Holy Pope derives his power by controlling the property and personnel of the Catholic Church worldwide. China does not accept that Pope is the real head of the Catholic Church. The democratization of the Catholic Church will weaken the power of the Holy Pope. The elected representatives of the laity and believers shall manage the Catholic Church. Elected Christian representatives, will control the appointment of the priests, manage the Church property, guarantee the equality of man and women, appoint women as priests, and develop international linkages with all other sects of the Christianity. The Catholic laity should directly elect Holy Pope, by means of one-person one-vote. India should head a worldwide movement to demand the election of a black African Catholic as the next Pope.

WHAT AMERICA FEARS MOST IS PD-59 FOR USA: United States fears that one day Red Indians will rise and demand independent statehood, excited about the United States role in Kosovo. Americans fear that if a Black American wins the presidential nomination of a the major political party, and goes on to win the election of the US presidency then the United States will split up. The USA will split even before the black President-elect takes the oath of the office. United States fears that the rising media cost of the presidential campaign make every presidential candidate vulnerable. China has shown that how easy it is to buy the influence in the White House. Political influence helped China steal sensitive nuclear weapon technology virtually free. China could bribe top politicians, top corporate executives, and top civil servants, to allow Chinese spies unrestricted access to almost every classified military, technology and nuclear secrets, even after secret caught them. United States is bribing politicians in India, Yugoslavia and in Third World, without realizing that American politicians would willingly sell political influence more readily and for cheaper campaign contributions.

WHAT FRANCE FEARS MOST? PD-59 FOR FRANCE: France fears that United States is waging a war against France to undermine the influence of France in the erstwhile French Empire. United States eliminated French influence in the Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo etc. United States desire to destroy the power base of France because France is a nuclear weapon power and supports the secession of Quebec. Direct United States and France war may take place over the issue of Quebec secession. Most French hate Americans and Englishmen. India should exacerbate US-France rifts and support the secession of Quebec. Christian Rwandans are massacring tribal Hutu. France is likely to take anti-American stand in French speaking West Africa. India should support France and oppose United States in French speaking Africa.

WHAT BRITAIN FEARS MOST? PD-59 FOR BRITAIN: Britain fears Asian invasions of Africa in the first decade of the next Millenium. After the fall of Apartheid in the South Africa, the next racist regime to fall will be Australia. The demands for the independence of Australia headed by Aborigines will grow and the small white population will fail to keep Australia and New Zealand out of the reach of Asian immigrants. The World War III will begin with the Chinese invasions of Australia.

WHAT NATO FEARS MOST? PD-59 FOR NATO: The European Union and NATO fears that if Serbs get hold of nuclear weapons, they will start the Third World War by launching preemptive nuclear strike on Saint Paul’s Cathedral in Vatican Rome. Serbia has joined the Union of Russia and Belarus. Once Serbia Army integrates into Russian Army, then Serbs are likely to get hold of nuclear weapons, and they would launch it on the Vatican at the first opportunity. Serbs are likely to start a nuclear war in Europe that will cause more than 100 million lives in Western Europe. The ongoing Catholic-Orthodoxy religious war, unless resolved to the Serbs’ satisfaction, has the potential to depopulate Western Europe in the next century.

WHAT TURKEY FEARS THE MOST? PD-59 FOR TURKEY: Turks are the foreign invaders in Turkey and Kurds are the sons of the soil. Kurds are Aryan and related to Iranians. Turkey fears that India-Iran military alliance will liberate Kurds and carve out the Greater Kurdistan in the Levant.

WHAT BLACK AFRICA FEARS THE MOST? PD-59 FOR AFRICA: The Black Christians control the political power in the Black Africa. The majority of the Africans south of Sahara still practice the indigenous tribal religion that is very similar to Hinduism. Indigenous, tribal religion worship spirits, goddess, and natural forces like Hinduism. Hindu missionaries will be able to convert Black Africans. India should mobilize tribal Africans to secure their fair share of political power in Africa.

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(0)(1024) 11(iv) Offense-Defense Balance Nuclear Doctrine of Damage Limitation:

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DAMAGE LIMITATION IS CLASSICAL STRATEGY: The Doctrine of damage limitation was doctrinally preeminent in the United States in the very early years of Robert McNamara’s tenure as secretary of defense. Damage limitation is far from a new idea. Before the nuclear age, armed forces provided damage limitation by serving as a hard shell around a society. To damage an enemy’s society, one had first to defeat its army and navy. The long range aircraft, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons appeared to change the situation. Henceforth intolerable damage could be inflicted, whether or not an enemy’s armed forces were defeated in the field. The bomber and missile wold always get through. Soviet military theorists in late 1950s accommodated the new technology by deciding that far from overturning the existing wisdom of Soviet military thought, nuclear missile weapons would enable the traditional tasks to be accomplished more swiftly and decisively. The Russian theorists have never accepted the preposition that nuclear weapons and missiles meant that Russian State and society must, let alone should, be totally vulnerable.

In the absence of the ability to hold down American casualties and economic damage to a level that is acceptable, the PD-59 American strategy of offense dominance either is a bluff or is heroically irresponsible. Casualties and economic damages in a nuclear war can not become low enough to be acceptable.

The alleged Soviet belief that victory is possible in a nuclear war is debatable. It looks like a propaganda ploy like the wars of national liberation. The United States PD-59 advocated the strategy of strategic offense. The doctrine of strategic Offensive developed in retaliation of the alleged Soviet objective of victory in a nuclear war. It is more likely to be a ploy of the American strategists to press a theory of American victory in a nuclear war on the United States government. Strategic offensive doctrine suggests the survive-ability of the nuclear war.

American offensive strategy of counter force and counter political control attacks on Russia may cause more than limited damages to Russia, resulting in Russian retaliation on America. The strategic logic of damage limitation may sound good as strategic logic, but even the proponents of intra-war (during war) deterrence do not claim that such a deterrent mechanism will work. No one can predict the course of a central nuclear war. Intra-war deterrence may function as hoped. However, there is a significant chance that the superpowers may be incapable of controlling a central nuclear war. The implementation of programs for ineffective damage limitation is foolish. It may mislead American policymakers into believing United States can wage a nuclear war and survive the nuclear war at an acceptable cost.

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(0)(1024) 11 (v) Defense Dominant Damage Limitation Nuclear Doctrine

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DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR ATTACK IS POSSIBLE: The doctrine envisages a defense-dominant world not a defense-exclusive world. Perfect defenses are not possible and not desirable, but even imperfect defense will save many lives. Strategic defenses will add greatly to the uncertainties that will promote deterrence-enhancing doubts in the minds of the attack planners. The Defense dominance is a strategic condition, which reverses the current relationship of relative advantage between offense and defense.

It is not obvious that defense-dominant world, as opposed to a useful level of defense for damage control is technically feasible. Russia is known to favor assured survival, it is not known to favor mutual assured survival. Russia may not cooperate in effecting an orderly transition from an offense-dominant to a defense-dominant world. An imperfect defense could be dangerous, if political leaders place undue confidence in it.

From the mid-1960s until the early 1980s, the United States endorsed a Theory of Strategic Stability. Strategic stability held that the active and passive defense of a superpower homeland is infeasible as well as undesirable. Nuclear peace rest, on the perception that in case of a nuclear war, catastrophe would be unlimited. SALT 1 and SALT 2 treaties licensed an offense-dominant unchallenged nuclear environment. The doctrinal dominance of the offense supports the reasoning of the MAD doctrine.

A world order enforced by offensive nuclear threats is likely one day to see a nuclear war. It is intolerable that the world should forever be vulnerable to a single sequence of major crisis mismanagement. Nuclear deterrence will not cease to function in a defense-dominant world. The Active defenses would not be totally leak-proof.

The Defense dominant posture would enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence. It reduces the quantity and quality of societal damage that imposed on Russia. It will reduce risks to the society. It also reduces the effectiveness and the quality of the nuclear deterrence.

Europeans do not like the idea of defense dominant doctrine, as it will lead to the demise of ABM treaty. Europeans fear that to avoid possible losses of American lives, the American policy makers may choose the alternatives that makes the European lives become expandable. Therefore, Europeans prefer offence dominant nuclear strategy.

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(0)(1024) 11 (vi) Size of Nuclear Arsenal Affects Nuclear Policy

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SUEZ CANAL CRISIS AND NUCLEAR STOCKPILE: Britain and France invaded the Suez Canal Zone when Egypt’s President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. Khruschev warned the Britain and France to withdraw or face the nuclear threat. The numbers of nuclear weapons held by Britain was in 1955 (10), 1956 (15); Soviets held in 1955 (200) and 1956 (426); and United States held 1955 (3,057) and 1956 (4618). British nuclear stockpile was much smaller than that of Soviets, and in the absence of the exercise of American nuclear deterrent, Britain had to eat the humble pie and withdraw. It signaled the demise of Britain as a world power, as well as the rise of the Soviet Union as the legitimate Super Power.

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND NUCLEAR STOCKPILE: In 1961, the nuclear stockpile was USA (24,173), USSR (2,471), and UK (50). In 1962, the nuclear stockpile was USA (27,609), USSR (3,322), and UK (205). The four-fold increase in the British nuclear arsenal suggested that the West had prepared for the show down with the Orthodox Russians. The First Catholic President of the United States, John F. Kennedy perhaps had conspired with the Vatican to use nuclear weapons to wipe out the empire of the Orthodox peoples. United States enjoyed 8 to 1superiority in terms of nuclear missiles. Catholic President John Kennedy was looking for an opportunity to use nuclear weapons to reestablish the dominance of the Catholicism in the world.

COMPARATIVE UNITED STATES & SOVIET ARSENALS: The nuclear arsenals of the USA and USSR were respectively: 1945 (6-0), 1946 (11-0), 1947 (32-0), 1948 (110-0), 1949 (235-1), 1950 (369-5), 1951 (640-25), 1952 (1005-50), 1953 (1436-120), 1954 (2063-150), 1955 (3057-200), 1956 (4618-426), 1957 (6444-660), 1958 (9822-869), 1959 (15468-1060), 1960 (20434-1605), 1961 (24173-2471), 1962 (27609-3322), 1963 (29808-4238), 1964 (31308-5221), 1965 (32135-6129), 1969 (27463-10538), 1975 (27235-19443), 1978 (24424-25393), 1981 (23191-32049), 1986 (23410-45000), 1990 (21781-37000), 1996 (12937-25000).

CHINESE NUCLEAR STOCKPILES: The numbers of nuclear weapons China had on year to year basis after the first test in 1964 are as follows: 1964 (1), 1965 (5), 1966 (20), 1967 (25), 1968 (35), 1969 (50), 1970 (75), 1971 (100), 1972 (130), 1973 (150), 1974 (170), 1975 (185), 1976 (190), 1977 (200), 1978 (220), 1979 (235), 1980 (280), 1981 (330), 1982 (360), 1983 (380), 1984 (415), 1985 (425), 1988 (430), 1989 (1989), and in 1996 (400) nuclear weapons.

FRANCE NUCLEAR STOCKPILES: The number of French nuclear weapons were as follows: 1964 (4), 1965 (32), 1971 (45), 1972 (70), 1974 (116), 1974 (145), 1975 (188), 1976 (212), 1983 (280), 1985 (360), 1987 (420), 1990 (505), 1991 (540), and in 1996 (450) weapons.

BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE: The number of British nuclear weapons was in 1953 (1), 1954 (5), 1955 (10), 1956 (15), 1960 (30), 1961 (50), 1962 (205), 1963 (280), 1964 (310), 1975 (350), 1985 (300), and in 1996 (260) weapons.

CHINA AS RISING NUCLEAR POWER: The nuclear stockpile was for China-France-Britain respectively was in 1964 China (1), France (4), and Britain (310). During 1971, stockpile figures were China (100), France (45), and Britain (220). During 1982, figures are China (360), France (275), and Britain (335). During 1990, the figures are China (435), France (505), and Britain (300). During 1996 the figures are China (400), France (450), Britain (260), Russia (25,000), United States (12,937). The comparative nuclear arsenals of China France and Britain was in 1964 (1-4-310), in 1968 (35-36-280), in 1970 (75-36-280), in 1975 (185-188-350), in 1982 (360-275-335), in 1986 (425-355-300), in 1990 (435-505-300), and in 1996 (400-450-260) respectively.

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: During 1962, the nuclear arsenal of United States stood at 27,609 warheads, which could have wiped out the Soviet arsenal of 3322 warheads. Britain in 1962 had 205 nuclear weapons, compared to Soviet Union’s arsenal of 200 warheads at the time of Suez Canal Crisis. In terms of nuclear prowess Britain was in 1962, what the Soviet Union was in 1955.

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(0)(1025) Chapter 12: Post-Cold War Era US Nuclear Warfare Strategy

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12 (i) Post Cold War Nature of Deterrence

GAP CONVENTIONAL & NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: The United States is defining the deterrent role of the nuclear weapons to be as separate as possible from conventional deterrence. Following developments have widened gap between conventional and nuclear deterrent. First, the United States is now the world’s preeminent military power. Second, the principal nuclear threat to American security comes from the proliferation of nuclear weapons rather than conflict among the five declared nuclear weapons states. There is at this time no plausible scenario projecting nuclear conflicts among the five, with the possible exception of a reemergence of a highly nationalistic aggressive regime in Russia.

GREAT EQUALIZER: Nuclear weapons in some sense are the great equalizer among powerful and non-powerful nations.

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: The NPT came into force in 1970, for an initial 25-year period and a successful extension conference concluded in 1995. The main points are the following: (1) The five declared nuclear weapons states are obligated not to transfer nuclear explosives and information concerning their design to non-nuclear weapons states, and non-nuclear states agree not to produce or accept nuclear explosives. (2) Nuclear weapons states agree to make civilian applications of nuclear technology freely available to non-nuclear weapons states. (3) The nuclear weapons states shall diminish their nuclear arsenals and work toward their eventual elimination. (4) The nuclear weapons states shall give both negative and positive security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states. They shall be committed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. They shall give assurances to protect non-nuclear weapons states against threatened or actual nuclear attack by other states.

DIFFUSION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY: One can build nuclear weapons of very substantial, but less than optimum capability, without access to information classified by the United States. Historically, it has never been possible to stem the diffusion of new military technologies once introduced.

NO POST NUCLEAR STRATEGY: It is wrong to say that nuclear weapon is a burdensome legacy of the Cold War that has lost its relevance. Nuclear weapon has not become counterproductive to American security. The nuclear weapons remain the central element in the defense of the nuclear powers. There is no post-nuclear strategy. Nuclear deterrence is still vital to the American national security. Nuclear weapons can not be dispensed with, in the post-Cold War world. There is now a high level of geopolitical uncertainty in the world, and the responses of the United States to the geopolitical uncertainty requires that nuclear weapons should retain an attenuated but still important role in American national security policy.

FEAR IS ESSENTIAL FOR DETERRENCE: The fear is central to the original meaning of deterrence. The word ‘deterrence’ is derived from the Latin de + terrere, literally ‘to frighten from’ or ‘to frighten away.’ Neither mutuality nor parity is a necessary is a necessary or inherent characteristic of the concept of deterrence. The term dissuasion derives from the Latin dis + suadere, ‘to advise or persuade against,’ and is clearly more comprehensive in meaning than deterrence in the post-Cold War era.

DECLARED DOCTRINE OF MASSIVE RETALIATION: During Cold War, it meant massive retaliation, with its stark punitive threat and heavy reliance on the strategic nuclear air offensive. It is the MAD Doctrine.

Extended Deterrence

EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: From the 1960s, after Cuban Missile Crisis until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the American nuclear policy was doctrine of Extended Nuclear Deterrence. Extended deterrence worked via the ‘seamless web’ of conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear forces. It ultimately depended on the threat of escalation to large-scale nuclear war.

Counter-Force Counter Control

COUNTER-FORCE & COUNTER-CONTROL DOCTRINE: First variation of the extended nuclear deterrence doctrine was the fear that deterred the aggressor could be a threat to destroy not urban-industrial areas per se but those items the opposing regime valued most. In the case of the Soviet Union, this meant the survival of the regime itself and its ability to preserve and perpetuate its control over the Soviet Empire. United States began to target Russian communications network and industrial centers rather than Russian military targets. It legitimized the concept of urban bombing in the post-Cold War era. United States from time of President Carter’s PD-59 policy document started the process to justify the destruction of the enemy’s civilian communications and non-military heavy industries during war. It can also work effectively against China. What the communist regime in China fears most is the survival of the communist monopoly of political power in China, and the survival of the ruling elite. China will buckle under, if one can threaten the continued rule of the communist party.

BMD Doctrine

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE DOCTRINE (BMD): It is the Second variation of the extended nuclear deterrence doctrine. It states that deterrence strengthens with the development of the ballistic missile defense. BMD system poses a threat the Soviet’s nuclear strike against USA will not succeed, because of the strategic missile defenses will shoot down incoming Soviet missiles. BMD system is very effective if linked to the prospect for subsequent punishment.

STRATEGIC AIR WAR DETERRENCE: Deterrence emerged in its modern form in the 1930s. Deterrence relied on capability to attack the whole of an enemy’s civilian population and civil infrastructure without first defeating its ground and naval forces. The theory of strategic air warfare argued that air forces could be themselves conduct a strategic campaign against the vital elements of the enemy’s power that could win a war, with little or no involvement by ground and naval forces. The implication of this theory led to the emergence of the theory of deterrence.

Infrastructure Wafare in Kosovo

INFRASTRUCTURE AIR WARFARE IN KOSOVO: The 1999 NATO invasions of Serb civilian infrastructure, power plants, factories, bridges, hospitals, buildings, resulted in decisive victory of NATO forces. The decisive bombing raids by precision guided munitions destroy the economic infrastructure of the enemy. The massive bombing fail to inflict decisive damage to the enemy’s military forces. The collapse of the Soviet Union allows American to win decisive wars by using non-nuclear weapons. Both sides in World War II resorted early to urban bombing. The devastating thousand plane raids, approaches nuclear strikes in the magnitude of damage they inflict.

LEGITIMIZING URBAN BOMBING: Bombers always get through. The only defense against urban bombing is offense, bombing raids against enemy urban targets. It means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly against the enemy if you want to save your women and children. The tolerance of civilian losses and legitimization of collateral damage to the enemy infrastructure, economic, industrial, communications, bridges, hospitals is the most significant characteristic of the post-Cold War military doctrine of the United States. The infrastructure warfare waged by NATO Air Force sets the legal precedent for infrastructure wars of the twenty-first century. The infrastructure warfare aims to cause collateral economic damages, without first defeating enemy ground and naval forces.

Les Aspin Doctrine

LES-ASPIN DOCTRINE: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States possesses overwhelming conventional power, the United States would benefit from the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons, if it were possible. The technology now makes it possible for the United States to achieve deterrence using conventional forces and weapons alone. A number of significant improvements made in the technology of conventional weapons in recent years, notably in accuracy, stealth, intelligence, and information support have enhanced the conventional warfare capability of the United States.

THEORY OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE: The theory of the conventional deterrence does not require that conventional weapons be as powerful, destructive, or fearful as nuclear weapons. The sophisticated non-nuclear weapons can now hold at risk those assets most highly valued by potential aggressors, for example, the enemy’s leaders’ lives, their military forces, key elements of the aggressor state’s civil infrastructure, and so on. The US resolve to use conventional as opposed to nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence is more palpable to non-Western leaders.

NUCLEAR WEAPON OFFSETS AMERICAN CONVENTIONAL FORCE: It is a lesson that some foreign leaders and militaries learned from the Gulf War and Kosovo War. It states that the nuclear weapons may be necessary in order to offset otherwise overwhelming conventional warfare capabilities of the United States.

A-BOMB NECESSARY FOR DETERRENCE: Nuclear weapons remain a necessary component of U.S. deterrence. In the light of the international situation and U.S. security interests as we can now know them, it seems impossible to remove nuclear weapons from U.S. deterrence calculations for the next 15 to 20 years until AD 2015. In the present state of turmoil and uncertainty, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons or their entire removal will be very unwise.

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(0)(1025) Ch. 12 (ii) Bottom Up Review of US Nuclear Doctrine Posture

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BOTTOM-UP REVIEW: The Bottom-Up review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions, NSIAD-95-56, was published on January 31, 1995. The DOD completed the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in 1994.

US will use A-bombs

UNITED STATES WILL USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS: In essence doctrine of the Flexible Response provided that the United States would use nuclear weapons first in case Soviet aggression in Europe would threaten defeat of NATO by conventional forces. Extended deterrence generated in effect an U.S. nuclear umbrella over its allies in case of Soviet aggression.

Weapons of Last Resort Doctrine

WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT DOCTRINE: The Bush administration proclaimed a doctrine of ‘weapons of last resort’ for the use of nuclear weapons, restricting their use to situations where U.S. supreme national interests were threatened. The ‘weapons of last resort’ doctrine when applied to many states who face serious threats to their very existence, like Pakistan, Israel, Taiwan and Serbia, would justify the possession of nuclear weapons by them. The Weapons of last resort doctrine can provide justification for universal nuclear proliferation. Therefore, the doctrine that United States should use nuclear weapons as a weapon of last resort, which remains on the books even after the end of the Cold War should now be abandoned.

SIOP

SIOP: The tension between secrecy and deterrence causes internal contradictions in the post-Cold War nuclear strategy. The SIOP is the operational plans that give the president some choice of alternative targets for the nuclear strikes. The SIOP remained very highly classified. However, the essence of deterrence is to threaten an opponent with a credibly unacceptable outcome.

OPENNESS INITIATIVE: This need for secrecy in the deterrent posture is also now under review. The Department of Energy’s ‘openness Initiative’ is a move toward declassifying at least some of the total U.S. nuclear resources, even if the operational plans beyond the general outline provided by the NPR remain secret. 0000

CURRENT UNITES STATES NUCLEAR POLICY: First, the United States now maintains a reduced but survivable, highly capable nuclear force that is in a nearly ready but not hair-trigger status. ICBM and SLBM have been de-targeted. Nuclear Bombers are no longer on the status of day-to-day alert. Second, the use of nuclear weapons by United States can not been ruled out, in response to the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against the United States. United States still deter aggression against U.S. forces and allies overseas in part with nuclear forces. Third, officially by treaty the United States renounces the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are not pact members with nuclear-armed states. In practice, the U.S. nuclear posture implicitly supplements deterrence of all military challenges to U.S. security interests, even from non-nuclear Third World states.

REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: First, the United States should do its utmost to retain an adequate conventional force posture and superior conventional force technology. Second, United States need not, indeed will provide a detailed description of exactly when, and under what precise conditions or against which targets nuclear weapons may be used. The United States need seldom or never explicitly raise a nuclear threat, whereas it should continue to suppress nuclear proliferation. Third, the Defense Department advocates retaining some nuclear forces in reserve for a nuclear hedge. Fourth, no one knows whether there will ever be another requirement for new or different nuclear weapons. The weapons designed to address Cold War threats, certainly are not what one would design today for the 21^st century. Fifth, the United States should not take steps or make statements or pledges that in practice would completely exclude nuclear retaliation from the calculations of non-nuclear states. To deter the rogue states that possess chemical and biological weapons and may contemplate challenges to American security, the nuclear retaliation should remain ambiguous. Sixth, remaining US nuclear weapons would be able, though not optimized to serve both strategic and tactical deterrence. The United States would attempt to make its nuclear weapons fade into the background, in order not to weaken its hand unduly in advocating nonproliferation. Seventh, the United States should retain adequate nuclear weapons capability and credibility to continue supporting extended nuclear deterrence by means of policy of flexible response. The Department of Energy, with the cooperation of the nuclear weapons complex, is developing a program that tries to fulfill these requirements.

Existential Nuclear Deterrent

DOCTRINE OF MINIMAL OR EXISTENTIAL NUCLEAR DETERRENT: An option widely explored is to move to a minimal or existential deterrence posture and policy. It advocates that the nuclear state should retain, either a very small alert nuclear force, or an off-alert force, or even dismantled forces. Whenever the security situation demanded, they can be reactivated. The proposal to dismantle all nuclear weapons but retain them for a rainy day suffers from some of the same problems as complete nuclear disarmament. There is also the risk that a decision to reconstitute nuclear weapons will exacerbate rather than stabilize a major crisis, either increasing the likelihood of war or dissuading the United States from rearming.

De-Nuclearization

DE-NUCLEARIZATION BY TREATY: This policy advocates the United States and the other nuclear powers should completely abandon nuclear weapons and denuclearize by agreement, with inspectors and safeguards. An alternative to the policy of denuclearization is to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and to deliver the remaining weapons into the hands of an international peacekeeping organization. It will retain the utility of nuclear weapons in deterring all forms of war, while eliminating the utility of nuclear weapons as instruments of national policy. It is implausible that the nuclear states are prepared to relinquish their sovereignty and control over their ultimate security interests to an international body.

1994 Nuclear Posture Review

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 1994 (NPR): The NPR is not a bottom-up reexamination of the roles of the nuclear weapons, but only a pragmatic examination of the current situation and near-term nuclear posture. The Department of Defense describes the NPR as interim. NPR confirms the decreased role of nuclear weapons in the US security policy. The NPR advocates a ‘reduce and hedge’ policy. The reductions in nuclear weapons are essentially those, that had already agreed to during previous administrations. The nuclear hedging provides for re-growth of US nuclear forces by re-MIRVing. Re-MIRVing means the increasing the number of warheads of the strategic missile forces by converting ICBMs into MIRVs. The end of Cold War implies the very significant changes in the American nuclear strategy.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD): The aggregation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons into a single WMD category is counterproductive. On should not classify the Biological and Chemical weapons under a single WMD category. Biological and chemical weapons and their evolution countered by non-nuclear military means. By proclaiming that the nuclear weapons may be necessary to counter biological and chemical warfare, may accelerate the development of these weapons by characterizing them as ‘poor man’s nuclear weapon.’

De facto No first Use Policy

Restricting the role of United States nuclear forces to respond to nuclear threats only is de facto equivalent to a ‘no first use’ policy. The No first use policy used to be advocated by Soviet Union but has been withdrawn recently by Russia, and even China is trying to dilute this no first use policy. Deterrence of non-nuclear conflict should be separately handled, as much as possible from the goal of deterrence of nuclear war.

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(0)(1025) Ch. 12 (iii) American War-fighting Doctrines

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NEED FOR A NATIONAL DOCTRINE OF WAR: The study of war Leads to varying conceptions of war and different doctrines of war. However, military commanders should have a common meeting ground of the war-fighting doctrines. During the Cold War, the military war-doctrines were distorted by nature of nuclear weapons and guerrilla war. A nuclear weapons power needs a military doctrine to manage the use of conventional armed forces without disturbing the nuclear Deterrent.

Strategic Defensive

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE: The military policy of Strategic Offensive, Rollback, and Liberation, became victim of nuclear weapons, and the policy underwent a profound change. Faced with the nuclear- armed Soviet Union and the possibility of a land war with China, the United States abandoned its Offensive Policy of rollback and liberation in favor of a Defensive Policy of Containment. The best battlefield result that the doctrine of the Strategic Defensive can achieve is that of the stalemate. That is what happened in the Korean War. It happened in the Vietnam War. The civilian wizards of Armageddon, the think tanks of tree-full-of-owls type of so called professional defense intellectuals without any combat experience have undermined the policy of military offensive and advocate slow squeeze Strategy of Gradual Escalation. Faced with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union and the possibility of a land war with China, the United States abandoned its offensive policy of roll back and liberation in favor of defensive containment. President Eisenhower threatened escalation to nuclear war in 1953. The Chinese and North Koreans intimidated by the threatened use of atomic weapons, agreed to signing of Armistice Agreement in July 1953. India should not adopt the policy of strategic defensive in India-Pakistan War.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE: The military policy of strategic offensive advocates that the military should seize the initiative and go on the attack to destroy the enemy’s armed forces and break his will to resist. While it is sometime necessary to go on the defensive to buy time and build one’s strength, as in the early days of World War II and Korea, this should be only a temporary condition. The policy of strategic offensive destroys enemy armed forces, as soon as possible. India shall maintain the policy of strategic offensive with Pakistan and in all other limited wars. The nuclear weapons power can not afford the stalemate that will result by adopting the policy of strategic defensive. The stalemate disturbs the nuclear deterrent.

Horizontal Escalation

HORIZONTAL ESCALATION OF MARITIME WAR: The 1986 Maritime Strategy stressed the importance of conventional rather than nuclear war. It called for the horizontal escalation of the NATO-Russia war. Its plan was to use Navy carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces for supporting the central front in Europe, as had previously been the case. It also involved moving them horizontally to apply pressure on Russia’s Middle East and Pacific flanks. The Navy will take operational offensive to seize and maintain control of the high seas. India’s maritime strategy stresses the importance of conventional horizontal escalation as a continuation of its policy of strategic offensive. Indian amphibious troops should simultaneously operate in Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kurdistan, and Somalia.

AirLand Battle Doctrine

AIR-LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE: As the U.S. Army leaders reexamined the dynamics of the battlefield, they realized that the previous division of war fighting into strategy and tactics was inadequate. “Strategy” dealt with the use of military to achieve the nation’s political objectives. The “tactics” dealt with the fighting on the battlefield. It had totally ignored the intermediate level of warfare, the guerrilla war, the Religious war, Peoples’ war, etc. The old operational dimension of war had defined three types of attack, the frontal attack, the penetration attack, and the envelopment attack. Labeled “Air Land Battle doctrine,” emphasizes the multi-dimensions of warfare. This new doctrine focuses on the operational level of war and on operational offensive operations. It undertakes, close operations, rear operations, and deep operations into the enemy homeland. Air Land Battle is a return to the tried and true principles of experience in war. The notion that nuclear weapons had rendered all past history, theory, and experience irrelevant was itself pronounced irrelevant. It advocates the joint employment of Army and Air Force tactical forces. Indian doctrine of Light Mobile Infantry shall be the joint employment of Army and the airlift wing of the Air Force.

BASIC AEROSPACE DOCTRINE OF USAF: The Air Force’s first mission, states the 1984 manual, is to neutralize or destroy an enemy’s war-sustaining capabilities or will to fight through attacks Directed against an enemy’s key military, political, and economic power base.” During the Cold War, the Air Force has been SACumsized with the Strategic Air Command and its nuclear strike mission dominating the entire Air Force. After Vietnam War, the Air Force too regained control from the civilian nuclear strategists.

INDIAN STRATEGIC AIR COCMMAND: India will set up a Strategic Air Command. Indian SAC shall provide nuclear deterrent and command the Nuclear Missiles Unit and the long-range bombers. Indian Air force shall acquire large airlift capacity and mid-air re-fuelling technology. Indian Air Force will develop a low cost indigenously produced bomber and a low-cost cargo plane. Indian Air Force shall manufacture very large numbers of low cost aircraft. Larger number of indigenous low cost aircraft would effectively dominate the skies in the limited wars.

Principal of Mass

PRINCIPAL OF MASS IN WARFARE: The ‘Mass’ is one of the principals of war. The principal of Mass dictates that one should mass, that is bring the bulk of one’s forces to bear on the primary objective. Then use an economy of force against secondary objectives. In both the Korean and Vietnam wars, the majority of U.S. assets and attentions were devoted to guard against the Soviet threat, and used an economy of force to fight the shooting wars in Asia. However, in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo wars, the bulk of US-NATO forces targeted on the primary objective against the enemy. Indian military doctrines states, that following the principal of mass, the bulk of India’s forces will target the primary objective, defined by the strategic offensive policy. Indian Army doctrine states that Mobile Infantry shall constitute the mass or military operations. Infantry Manpower provides excessive military mass in highly cost effective manner.

SeaLift Amphibious Warfare

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE: The Maritime Strategy is to build a sea bridge to the war theater to bring the nation’s mobilization capability to bear. Persian Gulf war saw the quickest and largest military US Sealift buildup since World War II. It was an 8,000-mile 250-ship haze-gray bridge, one ship every 50 miles from the shores of the United States to the shores of Saudi Arabia. These ships offloaded some nine million tons of equipment and petroleum products. Anticipating horizontal escalation the in case of a NATO war, the Navy was already on station when the 1990 Gulf crisis began. The US Navy sent some 120 warships to the Gulf region, including six carrier battle groups, which flew 23 percent of war’s combat mission. The Marine Corps manned the Amphibious Task Force in the Persian Gulf. It validated the Amphibious Warfare portion of the Marine Strategy. The two division of the 1-Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) supporting attack along the Gulf coast in fact became the main attack when 1-MEF rapidly penetrated the Iraqi defenses and advanced into Kuwait itself. It validated the Air-Land battle doctrine, where a commander will launch a frontal attack, “close operations,” and the “deep operations” into the enemy homeland. Air-Land Battle doctrine proved itself well especially its concepts of maneuver and deep operations. The primary role of Indian navy shall be to develop Amphibious Task Force, to acquire the capability to build a sea bridge to Indonesia, Somalia, or Persian Gulf. India should build 500 Launches and transport boats and 10 large cruise ships to develop the Sealift capacity for the simultaneous transportation of 10,000 Light Mobile Marine Corps to the Persian Gulf or to Cambodia.

MILITARY AIRLIFT: The aerial-refueling technique, allowed the US Military Airlift Command, in the 43 day campaign to fly more than 15,800 missions. It delivered more than half a million passengers and nearly half a million tons of supplies to the war zone. It included 2,700 aircraft from 14 nations. India should acquire the airlift capability for the simultaneous transport of 5,000 soldiers.

Airforce Doctrine

AIRFORCE DOCTRINE: The air campaign accomplished what the US Air force doctrine called for: “to neutralize or destroy an enemy’s war-sustaining capabilities by attacks directed against an enemy’s key military, political, and economic power base.” The Gulf War lesson number one is the value of the air power. The gulf War taught that one must maintain combat superiority in the skies. The military’s post-Vietnam warfighting doctrines were battle-tested in the combat against real enemies on the Persian Gulf battlefield. Indian Air Force Doctrine shall call for: “to neutralize or destroy enemy’s war-sustaining capabilities by attacks directed against an enemy’s key military, political, and economic infrastructure targets.

Joint Pub 1

JOINT WARFARE: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was certainly the classic example of a multi-service operation, a true joint operation. A doctrinal manual published by Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed forces is known as “Joint Pub1.” Joint Pub1 was the first time a joint warfare doctrine had been formalized. Joint warfare is essential to victory. Defense of the national security rests first on the concept of deterrence. If deterrence fails, then our single objective is winning the nation’s war. When we fight, we fight to win. The heart of joint operations is the campaign. The Indian Joint-Warfare Doctrine calls for Navy and Air Force to develop large Sealift and Airlift capability to transport Mobile Infantry to the war zones.

FOUNDATIONS OF JOINT OPERATIONAL ART: The Joint Operations doctrine includes the following operations. First, air and maritime superiority and space control. Second, capability for amphibious, airborne and air assault forcible entry. Third, the airlift and Sealift capacity for the transportation of personnel and equipment is very crucial. Fourth, communications and information control. Fifth, the direct attack on the enemy’s strategic centers, by aircraft, missiles, and special operations.

LAND OPERATIONS ESSENTIAL FOR JOINT OPERATIONS: Many elements of the joint operations may be directed at enabling the land power to be projected and directed against the foe. The sustained action on land is still the key. The ability to establish presence on the ground can be fundamental to achieving the joint campaign’s objectives and brining it to a successful conclusion. Indian Military Doctrine lay very high emphasis on sustained Infantry operations on land, in every type of joint operations.

From The Sea 1992 White Paper

PREPARING THE NAVAL SERVICES FOR 21^ST CENTURY: Among the most radical of post-Gulf War doctrine was the Sept 1992 White Paper, “From the Sea: preparing the Naval Services for the 21^st Century.” This new doctrine represents a fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea, toward joint operations conducted from the sea. The highly survivable nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines will remain critical to national security. The Sealift, remains an enduring mission for the Navy. Sealift is the movement of men and material by ship to the theater of war. Indian Naval Doctrine shall avoid open-ocean warfighting.

Naval Expeditionary Forces

NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES: The new direction and the primary thrust of the US Navy, is Naval Expeditionary Forces. It is a shift in focus from a traditional “Blue Water” Navy operating primarily on the high seas to a “Brown Water” Navy operating in the waters of the littoral or coastlines of the earth. The Navy and Marine Corps Team, the new doctrine emphasizes, will concentrate on littoral warfare, and maneuver from the sea, the tactical equivalent of maneuver warfare on land. The primary thrust of the Indian Navy shall be to become a dominant Brown Water Navy, to operate in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea Arabian Sea, South China Sea, and Sunda Sea. Indian Navy will concentrate on littoral warfare in the Persian Gulf, African Coastline, and Southeast Asia.

From the Sea

BATTLE-SPACE DOMINANCE: The “From the Sea” manual includes three principal tenets. The first tenet is “Battle-space Dominance,” bringing decisive force to bear on and below the sea, on land, in air, and in space as well. As the heart of naval warfare, the Battle-space dominance ensures access from the sea, and effective transition from open-ocean to littoral areas, and from sea to land and back, to accomplish full range of potential missions. Indian Navy will secure Battle-space dominance in Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Bay of Bengal.

Power Projection

POWER PROJECTION: The second tenet is power projection to apply offensive military force against the enemy. It involves the use of Marine expeditionary forces, carrier-based aircraft, land based expeditionary aircraft, missiles from submarines, and naval gunfire support to apply offensive military force against the enemy.

Force Sustainment

FORCE SUSTAINMENT: The third tenet is the force sustainment. World power’s influence depends on its ability to sustain military operations around the globe. It requires open sea-lanes of communication so that an adversary does not impede the passage of shipping. The keys to force sustainment are the forward logistics, pre-positioning, strategic sealift, and strategic airlift.

NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND: US Navy has created a Naval Doctrine Command to refine the new maritime strategy. The Army established TRADOC and Air Force established CADRE to develop their warfighting doctrines.

Naval Warfare NDP1

NAVAL WARFARE: In March 1994 the naval Doctrine Command published Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare. It stresses the shift from a global struggle envisioned under Cold War maritime strategy to preparations for regional challenges. The warfighting philosophy of navy incorporates the principles of war while making the best use of the inherent characteristics and advantages of the naval forces. The command of the sea is synonymous with naval strategy itself. The new emphasis on Battle-space dominance stresses primacy of land warfare in fleet operations. Superficially, this may not sound terribly revolutionary, but it represents a 180-degree reversal from the classic relationship between sea control and naval power projection. Land control has traditionally been a mission for the Army. Acting as an enabling force, the naval component may conduct operations initially to seize a hostile port facility or airfield as a precursor to the arrival of airlift, Sealift, and prepositioned assets. After achieving maritime, and air superiority, naval forces can continue to operate as an integrated part of larger joint operations.

Global Reach Global Power 1990

GLOBAL REACH AND GLOBAL POWER OF AIRFORCE: In June 1990, the Global Reach-Global Power,” outlined the Air Force’s strategic planning framework, to lead the Air Force into the twenty-first century. The emphasis of its news doctrine is warfighting. Air Force stresses its role in nuclear deterrence with its manned bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Air Combat Command

AIR COMBAT COMMAND: Air Force reorganized into “movers” and “shooters.” The Air Force Shooters include combat aircraft, bombers and tankers. Air Force Shooters formed into composite wings are under Air Combat Command. It is a signal that new gospel is air-power integration.

Aerospace Doctrine

BASIC AEROSPACE DOCTRINE OF THE UNITED STATES: The March 1992 edition of the Air Force Manual 1-1, entitled Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States, lays out basic aerospace doctrine of the USA. It states that elevation above the earth surface is the key to the difference between aerospace and surface-bound forces. The mission of the Air Force is to defend the Nation through control and exploitation of air and space. The control means to immediately establish and maintain total air control over the battlefield. To exploit air and space means to have global satellite surveillance, and the ability to deploy Bombers overhead anywhere in the globe in less than one day. Nations withdraw from overseas bases, and the land-based forces reconfigured for expeditionary actions. The airlift provides that expeditionary capability. The Air Force staked out a claim, for total control of the deep-battle portion of the Army’s Air Land Battle doctrine. The Air Force seek to control and exploit air and space not to facilitate operations somewhere else, but to achieve national objectives in an through this dimension. Air force could go it alone. Air force will give up the close air support of ground operations. Air Force is trying to put up walls between it and the others.

Air Land Battle Doctrine

AIR-LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE: Army is a member of the joint team. Army is dependent on Navy Sealift and Air force airlift to get to the point of action. The Army’s strategic center of gravity will be getting there. The Army will not operate alone. The Army is likewise dependent on Air Force, Navy, and marine air support for battlefield survival.

TRADOC -FM100-5

TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC): The FM 100-5, Operations, the new manual stresses Depth and Simultaneous Attack. The original Air Land battle doctrine emphasized Rear Combat, Close Combat, and Deep Operations. The doctrine allows for an Army more disposed to force projection than to forward defense. Joint warfare, the multi-service warfare is essential to victory. Doctrine is a dynamic process.

MILITARY DOCTRINE SUITED FOR PAX AMERICANA: During the first two years of the Clinton administration, the post-Cold War military policy has come a full cycle. It rejected the military roles in the limited war of counterinsurgency, in favor of a return to conventional offensive military operations. It lays emphasis on U.S. national interests and the exercise of military power under American command. Now American Armed forces are ready, at least in terms of military doctrine to create a global Pax Americana. India shall duplicate post-cold War US Army, Navy and Armed Forces doctrines, as these are tailor-made for a nuclear weapon power desiring to use conventional military forces for strategic offence. India should retain the terms used by US military doctrines to promote wider acceptance and dissemination of India’s military doctrines.

Explain Military Doctrine

EXPLAIN MILITARY DOCTRINE TO PUBLIC: Remember the Trinitarian roots of War. War was no longer a matter solely for kings, princes, presidents and prime ministers, but was the province of the remarkable trinity of the people, the government and the military. The nations can only engage actively abroad if the people and the legislature are willing to bear the cost of that leadership-in money, in political energy, and in lives. The nuclear age, religious wars and the end of Cold War does not alter these fundamental purposes. Indian Military doctrines should become the part of the compulsory curriculum in the schools and colleges.

CITIZEN’S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE FOR DEFENSE: In the age of civilizational wars, religious wars and the global threat of Islamic fundamentalism, is checked by the mass mobilization of the society. India should pass laws similar to the American Militia Act of May 8, 1792. It required the enrolment of every free, white, able-bodied male citizen between eighteen and forty-five in the militia of his state. Each citizen was to equip himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt and shall appear, so armed, accoutered, and provided, when called for exercise, or into service. Though call-ups were suspended in January 1973 in the closing days of the Vietnam War, the citizen’s responsibility to provide for the common defense remained. On May 23, 1994, the House of Representatives voted 273-125 to continue registration of eighteen-year-olds for the draft. It is a low cost insurance policy against unforeseen threats. It makes possible the mass call-up of American young men possible in the times of war. China has a policy of compulsory draft. India should pass legislation for a five-year compulsory military service for every able-bodied male and female between eighteen and thirty. India should have more than 5 million men and women in uniform, and a fully trained militia more than 50 million soldiers. India should pass an Indian Militia Act. It shall require the enrolment of every able-bodied male between eighteen and thirty, and every female between eighteen and twenty five, in the militia of his district. Every person will get a military uniform, and shall appear in military dress, when called for weekly military exercises. Every person shall serve five years in compulsory military service, or compulsory national service, or compulsory religious missionary services, or compulsory social service, when called for service. It is a low cost insurance against unforeseen threats. It makes possible the mass call-up of young Indian men and women in the times of war. There is no reason to fear that Indian men and women will shirk the citizens’ responsibility for common national defense, the service that American men have provided without any murmur.

STRENGTHEN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: A fundamental tenet of a military policy for a new world order must be to ensure the survival of the nation by guarding against nuclear annihilation. The nuclear weapons can not be dis-invented. As long as nuclear weapons exist, India must maintain a credible deterrent. During the Cold War, the basis of nuclear deterrent was Mutually Assured Destruction or MAD. The MAD doctrine rested on a simple premise: Each side had sufficient nuclear warheads and bomber or missile delivery systems that they could ride out a first attack by the other side, and still have enough nuclear weapons left to annihilate the attacker.

Counter Proliferation Denuking

COUNTER-PROLIFERATION & DENUKING: On December 7, 1993 defense Secretary announced a counter-proliferation proposal aimed at developing the strategic means of dealing with new nations that actually obtain weapons of mass destruction. India should develop a credible strategy to de-nuke Iran and Iraq. India cannot allow the proliferation of the Islamic nuclear weapons. The main reason that the rogue third world country leaders are un-deterrable is that the threat to use the nuclear weapons in regional conflict has lost its credibility. India should join forces with United States to denuke Pakistan in the event that Pakistan continues to make irresponsible threats of nuclear strikes against India. It is possible to denuke Pakistan as Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is not indigenous and depends upon Chinese supplies.

THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM: Arms control is not an end itself. India needs an effective shield to defend itself from rocket borne attack. Deployment of an effective ballistic missile defense of the India’s metropolises has to be among the first requirements of a military policy for India’s future.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE THE KEY: One of the defining features of the post-Cold War military doctrines is that the conventional military forces have become the true strategic forces, even when nuclear defenses are vital. Non-nuclear conventional forces, as strategic forces, shall be the forces capable of achieving national interests, goals, and objectives. Conventional military forces are the primary instrument for deterring war, and, if deterrence fails, for fighting and winning on the battlefield. Armed Forces are also the prime instruments for assuring allies of the certainty and the credibility of the support of Nation. The prepositioning of assets by overseas deployment will be downsized and rapid deployment to the crisis areas by Sealift and Airlift will become more important. Great Powers need a force capable of projecting power quickly when and where it is needed. The Army must develop a more mobile mix of mechanized and armored forces. The Air Force should emphasize tactical air power and airlift. The Navy and Marine Corps must maintain sufficient carrier and amphibious forces, as well as more Sealift.

Joint Forces

ADAPTIVE JOINT FORCE PACKAGES: The new concept envisions using tailored joint forces to conduct overseas presence operations. These Adaptive Joint force Packages, could contain a mix of air, land, special operations and maritime forces tailored to meet a Theater commander’s needs. During the 1994 Haitian crisis, for the first time in history, Army combats troops and helicopters were embarked on Navy aircraft carriers for deployment into the operational area.

Balance of Fear

SCARE THE ENEMIES: Armed forces will begin to build a “balance of fear” that can scare our enemies without bankrupting the nation. The essence of deterrence is to raise the fearful doubt in the minds of any potential aggressor that any possible gain is not worth the risk. The world should be scared to death of the Nuclear Power’s conventional military might. To do that is to get to the crisis areas “fastest” with the “mostest”. The mostest is measured not only in numbers, which still counts, but also in warfighting capabilities, including arms, equipment, combat readiness and training.

4 Wars Capability

SIMULTANEOUS FOUR REGIONAL WARS: The United States cannot fight more than two simultaneous regional conflicts. Even with weapons modernization and force enhancers the United States cannot fight two Vietnams simultaneously. India should develop close defense relationship with every rogue nation, including Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, and Serbia. In case of the clash of Hindu and European civilizations, India should engage in the major civilizational war, only when two or more regional wars are in full swing.

MOBILE INFANTRY WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE: The force enhancers are the technologically driven fourth generation of Warfare. It is a revolution in military affairs, it is a revolution in information, sensing, and precise strike technologies. The post-nuclear revolution, is a return to an emphasis on non-nuclear warfare. It stems from the dramatic effects of new military and civilian technologies. It would lead to the civilization of war, where the line between military and civilian endeavors shall blur. It will be warfare from computer terminal. The substructure of future wars will be information dominance. The primary building blocks of Information Warfare are pagers, cellular phones, global position satellite technology, lap tops with wireless Internet access, cyber medicine, computers, Communication systems, satellites, long lasting high protein condensed foods, light weight lethal weapons, all terrain vehicles, and sensors. Civilian Student draftees shall significantly contribute towards military victory, by harnessing the Information technology in modern warfare. Professional soldiers can not be retrained to handle modern technology. Professionals can become soldiers in six months. It is easier to train engineers and scientists to be soldiers than to train a soldier to be engineer or scientist. Compulsory draft will oblige the scientists and engineers to serve in the Army.

Light Mobile Infantry

LIGHT WEIGHT ARMED MOBILE INFANTRY: The Global Position Satellite (GPS) allows the military units locate their position with a hand help pager, pinpoint it on local military map via a Laptop PC connected to Internet via wireless. The GPS technology allows the base camp chart out the movements of their forward units equipped with pagers. Cellular telephones and Pagers allow instantaneous two-way communications of the forward units with the base camp. It allows the small units to operate deep into enemy territories for subversive purposes. High protein, light weight, dehydrated condensed food products allow the infantrymen carry 90 days ration in shoulder packs. Thinsulated clothing protects against extreme cold weather. All terrain vehicles allow deep penetrations in the desert lands. Light Mobile Infantry will become the lethal instrument of infantry warfare. Mobile infantry can be air dropped by helicopters deep inside enemy territory. Death and destruction will remain the coins of war’s realm. Moreover, the value of these coins will not diminish regardless how much technology is available to the information-age Army. In the Infrastructure warfare teams of 100 Light Mobile Infantry carrying 100 pounds of RDX explosives and incendiary bombs will enter the metropolises, and could burn it down. Light Mobile Infantry will be the most efficient instrument of warfare and cause excessive collateral damage to the economic infrastructure of the enemy. Information age technologies and Light Mobile Infantry will not take the military jobs away from soldiers, as it empowers ordinary students become lethal soldiers. Nuclear India will become a super power in conventional military warfare by developing Civilian Light Mobile Infantry to hunt and destroy Muslim Mujahideens, Guerrilla armies, and terrorists. Light Mobile Infantry will be trained for High Altitude Mountain Warfare, Desert Warfare, Jungle Warfare, Maritime Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare, and Religious Warfare.

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES: In defining its security policy, the Great Powers must address some fundamental questions about how it deals with the world: (1) What should its role in world Affairs be? (2) What objectives should its international efforts serve? (3) What sorts of means should it employ in seeking those objectives? The primary mission of the conventional Armed Forces of Nuclear Power is not peace operations; it is to deter, and if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which its most important interests are threatened. President Clinton’s July 1994 policy paper, 'A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,' states the following. The primary mission of U.S. Armed Forces is not peace operations; it is to deter, and if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened.

Escalation Dominance

MAINTAINING ESCALATION DOMINANCE: Physical military strength without the political will to use it creates paper tigers whose growls can be disregarded with impunity. The value of the objectives that determines the price, that shall be paid to achieve those objectives, both in magnitude and in duration. If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match your effort against his power of resistance. The enemy’s power of resistance includes the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The escalation dominance is the capability to escalate a conflict to the level where an adversary cannot respond. While nuclear defenses are critical, conventional forces will remain the nation’s true strategic forces.

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(0)(1025) Ch. 12 (iv) Role of Air Power in American Warfare Doctrine in War

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SUPER POWER: On the eve of the NATO bombing of Serbia, Slobodan Milosovich turned to the American envoys facing him. “You are a superpower, he said. “ You can do what you want. If you want to say Sunday is Wednesday, you can. It is all up to you.” In nutshell, it expressed the challenge of the Eastern Church to Holy Pope, “you can destroy us, but we will be right.”

It is WW III

THIRD WORLD WAR: The intriguing question is: Was NATO bombing of Belgrade represents the beginning of the World War III, that may continue for next five or six years? The Kosovo war was not an earthquake, comparable to World War I or II. The Kosovo War was a bolt of lightening that certainly illuminated the new international system that we are now in, the system of globalization. Kosovo was not the W.W. 3; it is just the beginning of the W.W.3. Kosovo did not change the world, but it has illuminated how much the world has changed.

NATO INTERVENTION IN BALKANS: The NATO intervention in the Balkans was made possible by the fact that two great wars in Europe in this century, were tribal wars between Germany and France. German-French rivalry was at the heart of World Wars I and II. The German-French entente made NATO intervention to quash the Balkan civil wars possible. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War made NATO’s intervention deep into the former Soviet sphere of influence permissible. These factors subsided, erasing the most important and paralyzing divisions and walls in Europe. NATO interventions will no longer be possible in the event that the German-France entente collapses or Cold War flares up between major nuclear powers. NATO bombings have miserably failed to destroy either the Serb military armor, or military morale, or the Serb public support to Milosevic. Slobodan Milosevic accepted NATO terms on Kosovo because Russia wanted him to accept it. Russia pressured Serbia, because now Russian Navy would acquire naval bases on the Adriatic Sea, as Serbia has joined the union of Russia and Belarus. Serbia and Montenegro effectively become a part of Russia, Belarus, Serbia Union. It is the beginning of the reunification of the Soviet Union.

Weakness of NATO

WEAKNESS OF UNITED EUROPE EXPOSED: The Kosovo war has brought radical changes to the European continent, thrusting Germany into a leading military role not seen since 1945. Germany has become a normal country in military terms, and that is a critical change for Europe. The 11-week NATO bombardment of Kosovo that was dominated by the United States, exposed Europe’s weaknesses in new military technologies, laser guided bombs, Strategic reconnaissance, and aircraft. Kosovo has been a watershed event in so many ways. For Germany, Kosovo represented a coming of age. For Europe, it has brought the crushing realization of the asymmetry of military power between it and the United States, and the need to do something about that. The French vision of a multipolar world is being reinforced. There is a need for Europe to counter American hegemony. The Europe has merged is defense body, the West European Union (WEU), with the European Union (EU) itself. It also appointed the NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, as its first high representative for foreign and defense policy. Kosovo has made it clear that a complete restructuring of European armed forces is needed. Europeans have also realized, more fully even than over Bosnia, that conflict on the continent did not end with the cold war’s conclusion, but merely shifted to the Balkans. There is no military exit strategy from the region. An international military presence to guarantee peace in the Balkans must be seen in the coming decades as something as natural as it was to have troops in divided Germany during cold war years.

US Invasions likely

WOULD USA INVADE OTHER COUNTRIES: In the Kosovo, war NATO bombed a neighbor that had not attacked its members first. Far too many Americans wrote and talked of Serbs, the allies of the United States in the World War I & II, as if they were bugs. The Kosovo war was the first military conflict since the end of the cold war fought outside the United Nations, with NATO as aggressor, under the system of globalization, fought primarily for humanitarian purposes. It probably will not be the last. That Washington and its European allies were willing to confront Mr. Milosevic is a powerful signal to other tyrants that the instigation of ethnic violence, even within their own borders, can reach a point that the world will not tolerate. The Kosovo war has caused fear of America in some countries that one day the United States will fly over their lands to bomb them into submission for not carrying out the orders of the Western alliance.

PRIMACY OF BOMBERS AS INSTRUMENTS OF WAR: Bombers proved their effectiveness as an instrument of Infrastructure Warfare. Air power is not a panacea, but the war in Serbia demonstrated that sustained aerial attack with precision munitions erodes, resistance and brings retreat. NATO bombed Serbs’ power plants, factories, homes, hospitals, and bridges with destructiveness only the Germans had achieved against the Serbs in World War II, and caused unnecessary civilian casualties. The bombardment of Serbia and Iraq suggests that most air defenses can be defeated by American weapons systems. Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, who ran the NATO air campaign declared, “I believe air power established itself in this campaign. I credit this as a victory for air power. Yugoslavia suffered an estimated damage of $40 billion from the bombing. American warplanes flew 60 percent of the 35,000 allied missions and more than 60 percent of the 10,000 bombing runs. I feel that on the first night, the power should have gone off, and major bridges around Belgrade should have gone into Danube, and the water should be cut.” The NATO bombing proved that the air-superiority leads to the ineffectiveness of the anti-aircraft missile defense system. It happened in Serbia. To guide a SA-3 or SA-6 missiles to hit allied planes; Serb anti-aircraft crews need to keep radar turned on for a certain time. However, the longer they do so, the allied missiles then can track the radar signal and destroy the radar. Then missiles can destroy the missile systems.

US May Use Atom Bombs

UNITED STATES’ USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: During Cold War, in essence doctrine of the Flexible Response provided that the United States would use nuclear weapons first in case Soviet aggression in Europe would threaten defeat of NATO by conventional forces. Extended deterrence generated in effect an U.S. nuclear umbrella over its NATO Allies in case of Soviet aggression. During post-Cold War era, in practice, the U.S. nuclear posture implicitly supplements deterrence of all military challenges to U.S. security interests, even from non-nuclear Third World states.

COUNTER-PROLIFERATION & DENUKING: On December 7, 1993 defense Secretary announced a counter-proliferation proposal aimed at developing the strategic means of dealing with new nations that actually obtain weapons of mass destruction. Had India not exploded nuclear devices in 1998, then United States might have invaded India after the victory in Kosovo? United States is very likely to use tacticalnuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations in the twenty-first century, to avert defeat in conventional wars. United States will deploy tactical neutron bombs and tactical nuclear weapons in the future wars. India sshould develop a clear doctrine to deter preemptive US nuclear strikes. Indi should declare that in case of any US nuclear strikes, India would depopulate Australia and New Zealand.

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(0)(1026) Ch. 12 (v) Rapid Response Infantry Brigades Ends Age of Tank Warfare

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Restructuring Army

US ARMY RESTURCTURING: It was a first step that could ultimately be the most significant restructuring of the American Army’s combat divisions since the Vietnam War. It would transform the nature of Infantry all over the world. The US Army announced on October 12, 1999 that it would create two new lighter, more mobile brigades able to deploy anywhere in the world within four days or 96 hours. With the US Army being called on to send troops across the globe, all Army divisions would have to become more mobile, able to travel abroad cargo aircraft like the C-17, which carry only one tank at a time. The goal of the US Army will be to deploy a full division with 15,000 soldiers within five days or 120 hours. That is quite a stretch from the current capability of the United States.

SLOW ARMY RESPONSE TO POST-COLD WAR CRISES: Responding to the criticism that the US Army had moved slowly to adjust to the post-Cold War crises likely to confront the United States, the US Generals outlined a major transformation of the US Army over the next decade, beginning with new Brigades for Rapid Response. The US Army would reduce the large support units that accompany combat brigades when they deploy. The US Army would reconsider the weapons systems it buys, paying greater attention to those that are lighter but still lethal.

End of Mechanized Warfare

HEAVY WEAPONS ARE OBSOLETE: With advances in technology and tactics, the heavy weapons now at the heart of the Army’s structure, like the 70-tons Abrams M1-A1 tank, could become obsolete, said General Shinseki, the US Army Chief of Staff. (NYT, 10/13/1999) Wheeled vehicles that could be moved overseas in greater numbers more quickly would replace 70-ton

End of Abrams Tank

ABRAMS M1-A1. Today’s announcement was a significant reversal for the US Army, which only last year considered but then rejected changes in the structure of its forces. The issue revived this year after the NATO air war against Yugoslavia, when the US Army took more than a month to deploy a squadron of Apache helicopters to Albania. In the changing world in which we live today, United States has to be able to get to the fight faster. Many details of the proposal remain unresolved, including the exact size and shape of the new brigades.

Demise of Heavy Armored Divs

DEMISE OF HEAVY ARMORED DIVISIONS: The US Army’s distinction between Heavy Armored Divisions, and Light Infantry Divisions and Airborne Divisions would soon disappear. If technology provides the answers we think, then what we have traditionally described as light and heavy will begin to merge. I think you will see the entire transformation will go toward capabilities that give those divisional formations the lethality that the heavy forces have and the agility of the lighter forces, said General Shinseki.

US ARMY STILL COLD WAR ARMY: Of all the armed services, the US Army probably has arguably had the most difficult time transforming itself to reflect the unpredictable world in the post-cold war era. The US Army has moved too slowly to change a force that, although smaller, still looks much as it did when the United States was prepared to slug it out with the Warsaw Pact on the plains of Europe. The US Army now understands the challenges it faces.

LARGE FORCES WITHOUT SUPPORT BASES: The Army of future would have the ability to put large forces into combat in remote areas without the support bases it has relied on in past conflicts. In the Persian Gulf War, the United States had six months to build up a force in Saudi Arabia before driving Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.

Self Propelled Howitzer

DEMISE OF CRUSADER SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER: To accomplish that the US Army would reconsider the weapons that it has designed for the future, shifting attention to those that are more mobile. One of the US Army’s biggest program the $11.5 billion effort to build a self-propelled howitzer called the Crusader would be dramatically scaled back or cut altogether.

Medium Forces Rapid Response Brigades

MEDIUM FORCES RAPID RESPONSE BRIGADES: The two brigades are designed to be ‘Medium Forces-lighter than the heavy armored vehicles but still operating with armored vehicles, unlike infantry or airborne troops. They expect to have about 3,000 soldiers each. Rather than relying on 70-ton Abrams M1-A1 tank, the Rapid Response Brigades will be equipped with lighter armored vehicles, no more than 20 tons each. The US Army would buy the existing vehicles now available, such as those used by the US Marine Corps.

RESTRUCTURING OF US ARMY: The US Army now has six (6) heavy and four (4) light divisions. The Rapid Response Brigades would serve as a model in the years ahead for restructuring the rest of the US Army’s six heavy armored divisions and four light airborne infantry divisions.

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(0)(1027) Ch. 12 (vi) Overseas Storage of Atomic Weapons Makes them ICBMs

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Overseas Bombs Become ICBMs

OVERSEAS IRBM ACTS LIKE AN ICBMs: If you can not bring the enemy target within you missile range, you can take your missiles nearer to your enemy to bring it under the missile range. The foreign base even inland base becomes the unsinkable nuclear missile carrier in the nuclear missile age. The inland military bases could play the role geopolitical role similar to the role of overseas Island-bases during Maritime Colonial Age. Land-locked military bases also acquire new value in the nuclear missile Age.

DEPLOY MISSILES WORLDWIDE: Those nations who can not make number of ICBMs could deploy IRBM in overseas bases. The chain of overseas military bases becomes strategic asset in the nuclear war. If a nation can not afford building vast arsenal of ICBMs, it should deploy shorter-range IRBM and tactical missiles in overseas military bases. The United States stored 12,000 nuclear weapons and components in at least 23 countries and 5 American territories during the cold war-including Morocco, Japan, Iceland, Puerto Rico and Cuba. United States stored 38 types of nuclear weapons systems at American or allied bases abroad. President Bush announced in 1991 that he was withdrawing all tactical nuclear weapons sent abroad. United States did not always inform governments that it was sending nuclear weapons to their territory or at their naval bases or storing them there.

REMOVABLE PLUTONIUM WARHEADS: Pentagon made special nuclear weapons in which plutonium or uranium could be removed and stored elsewhere. This was done in order to evade the issue of whether nuclear weapons or materials were stored in countries where there was intense antinuclear fervor. First American nuclear weapons placed abroad were sent not to Britain, but to Morocco, the site of several strategic American bases. United States had stored depth charges, with the nuclear materials removed, at its base in Guantanamor, Cuba

SENSITIVE NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENT: American nuclear weapons or materials were once deployed in such sensitive places as Japan, Iceland, Taiwan and Greenland. All these nations have forsworn nuclear weapons and publicly vowed not to allow them to store them on their territory. United States, the only country known to have placed nuclear weapons abroad, still keeps such weapons in at least seven places - Belgium, Greenland, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey and Britain. During the height of the cold war in 1970's, the United States had more than 7,000 nuclear weapons in NATO countries and more than 2,000 on land in the pacific region.

NUCLEAR VULNERABILITY OF FOREIGN BASES: United States made the countries a nuclear target by placing nuclear weapons in Japan, Taiwan, Turkey, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, and Germany. You make a country a target by admitting that you have put nuclear weapons there.

Rebirth of Need of Foreign Bases

BASES RELEVANT IN MISSILE AGE: Overseas military bases do not become outdated in the missile age. Shorter-range missiles cost less. The cost of warheads is less than the cost of the Missiles. India should secure military bases worldwide to store medium-range IRBM and short range missiles. India should secure military bases in Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Asia Pacific region. Indian military base in South China Sea would deter Chinese military adventure. Indian military base in Europe would deter NATO interventions in Asia.

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(0)(1027) Ch. 12 (vii) New Age of JDAMS Smart Bombs Cheaper PGMs

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American Air Armada

AMERICAN AIR ARMADA: United States military doctrine seeks to avoid American casualties and rely on air bombing. United States expects that its Allies, NATO would provide the cannon fodder to fight land wars. America has leant the lessons of the Vietnam war that it can not fight any major land war. US Air force proved its competence in the Kosovo War. The secret of US Air War success even against Serbian forces with sophisticated air defense system, was that Serbs needed to keep their Radar on to track the NATO bombers. The NATO bombers could track the source of the Radar to shoot them down. Peponderant Air Power would succeed in blinding the enemy because the Radar operators would fear risking their life and avoid the incoming bombers for fear of missile attack.

Joint Direct attack Munitions

JOINT DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS: The most powerful lesson of the 78-day air campaign in Serbia was the confirmation of the importance of the precision weapons, especially the Joint Direct attack Munitions, bombs that strike a target guided by Global Positioning System satellites. That is the biggest deal. It was known beforehand that JDAMS were great, it was nice to have it confirmed.

AMERICAN AIR ARMADA: The burden to fly the bombing missions fell on the United States. The US Air Force with its satellite-guided smart bombs, other precision weapons, sensors and mission-planning computers, flew the vast majority of the roughly 13,000 combat sorties, with France a distant second.

INFERIOR EUROPEAN MILITARY: The West European militaries will not be given the money needed to increase their forces and readiness much and instead will become a B team, acting as ground troops for the American air armada. That imbalance can only be altered if the Europeans produce or buy precision munitions. Several NATO countries said that they would pull out of the coalition if there were any chance of a land invasion.

RUSSIANS MADE MILOSEVIC TO WITHDRAW: Russia's role in isolating Mr. Milosevic was critical in persuading him to withdraw from Kosovo. The other factors, the intensified bombing around Belgrade, the resurgence of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and the threat that NATO might mount a ground invasion, failed to impress Mr. Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo.

KOSOVO MOST PRECISE AIR CAMPAIGN IN HISTORY: It was the technological and logistic superiority of the United States that ensured victory for the NATO alliance. The US had carried out the most precise air campaign in history and one with the fewest civilian deaths or injuries. Not a single pilot was killed in combat during 78 days of around-the-clock operations. There is a misapprehension that this is the goal of the United States that this is a standard that has been set by the Pentagon.

WEAKNESS OF THE ALLIED OPERATIONS: The Allied forces were too slow in choosing targets during the Kosovo War. United States seriously underestimated how many precision-guided munitions would be needed. The Kosovo War was fought with too much reliance on American forces. The NATO did not have a military capability to launch the decisive land invasion. The West Europeans did not contribute substantially towards victory. Had India dispatched an army of 100,000 soldiers to defend Serbia, then NATO invasions would have failed. United States-India invasions would have been more effective than US-NATO invasions. Perhaps Pentagon should recommend to scrap US-NATO alliance in favor of US-India alliance. The fundamental lesson of 78-days civilian infrastructure bombing invasions in Kosovo is that neither NATO nor United States would win any future land wars. Milosevic should have invaded Bosnia at the beginning of the air bombing campaigns.

Infrastructure Warfare

CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE WARFARE: Commandos are the human JDAMS. Commandos are human direct attack munitions aptly called HDAMS. The fundamental lesson for a land power is that do not allow American to fight a war without substantial casualties. Had Serb commandos attacked NATO troops in Bosnia, Croatia on day 2 of the 78-day War, then Serbia would not have incurred $40 civilian damage by Allied Air bombing. Serb commandos could have burnt down with RDX explosives some nuclear power plants, power plants, large industrial complexes, chemical plants in Germany or Italy, in retaliation to NATO's civilian infrastructure war. A group of 100 Serb commandos, with every commando carrying 50-kg RDX explosives that sneak into Mediterranean cities could cause the collateral damage of 10 billion dollars to NATO members. Western European metropolises could be burnt to the ground by RDX carrying commandos in future World Wars. The NATO's civilian infrastructure warfare in Kosovo legitimizes the burning of the metropolises in future wars. In future wars armies would avoid confronting hostile armed forces to concentrate the burning of the cities, power plants, fertilizer plants, chemical plants, bridges, and power lines. The Kosovo War legitimizes the total wars of annihilation of metropolises and civilian industrial infrastructure. In civilian infrastructure warfare, every RDX equipped commando of the rapid deployment force could cause the collateral damage of $100 million. The civilian industrial infrastructure of the Western Europe would be totally destroyed and burnt to ground in the next world war.

Drone air Planes

RISE OF DRONE AIRPLANES: Pilotless drone airplanes play very crucial role in the information gathering and for directing the JDAMS. The drone airplanes and GPS satellites allow the precision guided munitions and smart missiles to destroy the enemy targets.

Tanker Aircraft

TANKER AIRCRAFT: Mid-air refueling of the bombers enhances the range and allows them to carry heavier load of bombs. Tanker aircraft acts like the military base on air. The Tanker aircraft is aircraft carrier in air. The Tanker Aircraft serves the role that the spaceports would do to the spacecraft in future and aircraft carriers do at sea.

AWACS War HQ in Air

AIRBORNE WARNING & CONTROL AIRCRAFT: AWAC become the war headquarters in the air. The military role of AWAC would increase in the conduct of air wars in future.

Infrastructure Wars Fatal

INFRASTRUCTURE WARFARE FATAL: The legitimization of civilian infra structure warfare would make future wars barbaric and lead to the return of the burn the cities ground warfare. The future armies would avoid confronting the enemies and instead attack defenseless civilian residential, industrial, utilities, transportation and infrastructure targets, to inflict huge collateral damage.

12 (viii) Cyber Warfare Command Center

WAR GAMES: General Henry H. Shelton publicly acknowledged that the United States played hacker itself earlier in '99 waging a keyboard war against Serbian computer networks. Pentagon has created a new military center to harness the nation's disparate cyber-warfare forces under the Airforce Space Command at Peterson Airforce base in Colorado Springs. The new command's first mission will be to coordinate the defense of the military's computer networks against foreign threats and cyber-terrorists. Soon after the mission will expand to include offense. Joint Task Force Computer Network attack, in Pentagon jargon, is designed to conduct wartime military operations against computer networks in enemy countries. The addition of an information-war fighting capability to the Pentagon's quiver takes activities that have largely been confined to covert military and intelligence operations and makes them a part of the nation's military chain of command. The new center is a public acknowledgement that as the world's most technically advanced nation, the United States is the most vulnerable to foreign cyber-threats.

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Kalki Gaur Books are as follows:

Kalki Gaur, “GLOBAL CLASH OF RACES” (2006)

Kalki Gaur, “DIPLOMACY OF CIVILIZATIONS” (2006)

Kalki Gaur, “MANIFESTO OF NEOCONSERVATISM” (2006)

Kalki Gaur, “HINDU HOLY GITA – MOKSA VIA RELIGIOUS WARS” (2006)

Kalki Gaur, “DA VINCI CODE AS CLASH OF RELIGIONS” (2006)

Kalki Gaur, “GLOBAL CLASH OF RELIGIONS” (2006)

Kalki Gaur, “GNOSTIC BIBLE” (2006)

Kalki Gaur, “POPULIST MANIFESTO” (2006)